In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

The Center for the Publication of
the U.S. Espionage Den's Documents
Ayatollah Taleghani and Dr. Mofatteh intersection,
P.O. Box: 15815-3489 Tel: 824005

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE
COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

Having published the documents concerned with Shariatmadari, Moghaddam Maraghei and Hassan Nazieh in the book No. 5 of the Moderates, the present book contains documents about Abbas Amir Entezam (in addition to those included in book No. 10), Bahram Bahramian, Khosrow Qashqai, Sam Sanjabi, Ali Saifpour-Fatemi, Touraj and Fereidun Nasseri.

Like the previous book, explanatory notes are provided to further familiarize the reader(s) with the text of documents concerning every one of the above mentioned individuals, with the hope of having taken another step in exposing U.S. imperialism's local bases, while having frustrated America's efforts in placing deviate currents vis-a-vis the Islamic Revolution.

Muslim Students, following
the Line of the Imam.
March 1986

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5 . Willingness for the exchange of explanatory notes.
5 . (a) The meeting of Entezam, Yazdi and Bazargan with Bedan Coupuff.
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10. Entezam's contact with the chief of the C. I. A. station in order to set a time for a consultative meeting.
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4 . Endorsement of the proposed address by the London base.
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31. Evaluations and views concerning the reports.
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2 . Qashqai's biographical data.
3 . Conversation with Qashqai.
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5 . Qashqai's meeting with Foneset, the representative of the American Consulate.
6 . Mr. Komo.
7 . Khusro Khan Qashqai.
8 . Qashqai's plans.
9 . Refusal to give Qashqai American visa.
10. Political activities of the Qashqai Tribe and the preparation for [illegible]
11. The views of the chief of the Qashqai Tribe about the [illegible] ation in Iran.
12. Supplementary technical details of the previous document.
13. Activities regarding the plan for publishing a daily newspaper with the help of Qashqai.
14. Evaluations and views: of Qashqai's report.
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16. The military and political activities of the Qashqai Tribe.
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24. The text of Ahern's comments about Khusro Qashqai.

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1 . Readiness of the C. I. A. headquarters to meet with Sanjabi.
1 . (a) Information concerning the citizenship of Yazdi.
2 . The turning down of Sanjabi's request by the C. I. A.
3 . Sam Sanjabi (Karim Sanjabi's son) and the C. I. A.
4 . Sam Sanjabi and the C. I. A.
5 . Forouhar's remarks on the change of cabinet.
6 . Forouhar's comments.

The contents of the documents concerning Ali Seifpur Fatemi and S. D. Rite.

1 . A brief account of Fatemi and his beliefs.
2 . The programme for contacting Fatemi after his exit from the country.
3 . Address and telephone number of Fatemi.
4 . Contact with S. D. Rite concerning Fatemi.
5 . The C. I. A. headquarters' directive about making contacts with Fatemi.
6 . Biographical data of Fatemi (and the record of his student-days, a Foreign Ministry document).
7 . The educational record and Fatemi's difficulty in getting American citizenship.
8 . Iranian students.
9 . Continuation of the topic of Fatemi's educational record, and his difficulty in getting American citizenship.
10. The action taken by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship concerning Ali Fatemi.

The contents of the documents concerning Touraj and Feridun Nasseri:

1 . The plan for contacting Touraj Nasseri and record of his past contacts.
2 . Determination of identity.
3 . Feridun Nasseri's biographic data and the record of his C. I. A. connections.
4 . Future plans of Dr. Nasseri.
5 . Feridun Nasseri's record.

Real Name: Amir Abbas Entezam.

Code Name: S. D. Plod/1.

Occupation: Prime minister Bazargan's deputy, the provisional government's spokesman, and a liberation movement member.

The present documents about Amir Entezam are in the form of classified documents, which were completed or found after the publication of book 10 concerning Amir Entezam. These documents are indicative of the continuation of the C. I. A. 's operational tactics concerning exchange of information with the provisional government of Bazargan. Two more points can be distinctly noticed in addition to that which has been mentioned in book 10: 1- Amir Entezam had connections with the C. I. A. and with George Cave (Adelisk), a senior C. I. A. agent, since the beginning of 1340 (1961). 2- In appointing Amir Entezam as ambassador to Stockholm two objectives were pursued by the leaders of the Liberation Movement (provisional government). Firstly, that he would act as the agent of the provisional government for re-establishing its connections with the C. I. A. and exchanging information with it. Secondly he was to allure the Iranians living in Europe in to returning home.

S E C R E T 311851Z JUL 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 485968.

TO: PRIORITY STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: STOCKHOLM 25929

1. DEPARTMENT IS SENDING TELEGRAM TO EMBASSY STOCKHOLM ASKING THEM TO CONTACT NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN AMIR ENTEZAM. EMBASSY IS TO PROPOSE TO ENTEZAM THAT FSO WHO WELL KNOWN TO ENTEZAM TRAVEL TO STOCKHOLM TO MEET WITH HIM.

2. FYI ONLY. THIS ACTION BEING TAKEN BY DEPARTMENT AT RTACTION INSTIGATION. IF ENTEZAM AGREES TO MEETING, PLAN HAVE FORMER DCOS TEHRAN, JOSEPH W. ADLESICK ACCOMPANY FSO AND MEET WITH ENTEZAM. COS AT HIS DISCRETION MAY INFORM CHARGE THAT MEETINGS WITH ENTEZAM ARE BEING PUSHED BY SENIOR LEVELS USG AS MEANS EXPANDING USG CONTACTS WITH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

3. ALL CONCERNED WOULD LIKE PULL OFF THIS MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. NO FILE. RVW 31 JULY 99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#7934

4 Aug 79

E C R E T 0316342 AUG 79 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 488309.

O: IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

IACT STOCKHOLM.

NINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

EF: DIRECTOR 485969

1. ADLESICK WILL ACCOMPANY FSO MR. JOHN STEMPLE ON TRIP O STOCKHOLM ARRIVING STOCKHOLM SUNDAY MORNING BY NORTHWEST IRLINE FLIGHT 30.

2. REQUEST STATION MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR ADLESICK (IDEN) AND LEAVE MESSAGE WITH NORTHWEST AT AIRPORT. WOULD PREFER RESERVATIONS IN SAME HOTEL EMBASSY MAKING RESERVATIONS FOR STEMPLE.

3. NO FILE. RVW 3 AUG 99. DRV DOC.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#2604

S E C R E T 231342Z AUG 99 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 43996

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD

REF: DIRECTOR

1. BIEDENKOPF BRIEFED, BAZARGAN, YAZDI, AND ENTEZAM ON AREA SITUATION FOR TWO HOURS ON 22 AUGUST. CHARGE AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR ALSO PRESENT. LENGTH OF SESSION, (WAS TO BE ONE HOUR) AND NUMEROUS QUESTIONS INDICATE ..... WELL RECIEVED.

2. AFTER BRIEFING, BAZARGAN THROUGH ENTEZAM STATED HE HOPED SIMILAR BRIEFINGS COULD BE PROVIDED EVERY TWO MONTHS, OR MORE ..... IF SPECIAL NEED AROSE. BAZARGAN WAS TOLD RESPONSE TO THIS WOULD BE WORKED OUT THROUGH CHARGE AFTER WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS. ENTEZAM THEN SAID "WE HOPE YOUR ORGANIZATION WILL IMPROVE ITS TIES WITH US JUST AS OUR COUNTRIES ARE IMPROVING TIES THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE CHARGE AND DR YAZDI. ENTEZAM WAS RIGHT NEXT TO BAZARGAN AND WHEN HE SAID THIS (BAZARGAN UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH TO HAVE CAUGHT THE MEANING) BUT THERE WAS NO INDICATION THIS STATEMENT CAME FROM BAZARGAN. BIEDENKOPF DID NOT REVEAL RTACTION CONNECTION OR RESPOND ADLESICK APOLOGY FOR HIS INABILITY TO COME AND ENTEZAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM IN STOCKHOLM. ENTEZAM SAID HE DEPARTING TEHRAN FOR STOCKHOLM ON 23 AUGUST AND WANTED TO SEE ADLESICK SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN. ENTEZAM HAD BEEN VISITING KHOMEINI IN QOM EARLIER IN THE DAY SO IT IS POSSIBLE HE HAS SOME INT. OF VALUE.

3. NO FILE. RVW 22 AUG 99 DRV D9C1. ALL SECRET

DIRECTLY TO THIS COMMENT. GETTING ENTEZAM ASIDE, BIEDENKOPF EXPRESSED





E C R E T 1313202 AUG 79 STAFF

E DIRECTOR 493618.

IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

INTEL RYBAT SDPLGD

1. PE DISCUSSIONS WITH ADLESICK DURING RECENT TDY STOCKHOLM
ST COS PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO DCM: "PLEASE CONTACT MR.
AM AND TELL HIM THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THE BRIEFING ANY
AFTER 29 SEPTEMBER. PLEASE HAVE MR. AMIR ENTEZAM CALL DR.
AND HAVE HIM CONTACT OUR CHARGE' IN TEHRAN SO THAT THE EXACT
FOR THE BRIEFING CAN BE SET."

ADLESICK PLANNING TDY TO STOCKHOLM AFTER DATE OF
ED UP. WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH STATE AFTER RECEIVING
ROM TEHRAN. WILL KEEP STATION ADVISED.

201-982054. RVW: 13 AUG 99 DRV DSC-1. ALL SECRET



E C R E T 0316472 AUG 79 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 488323.

: IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHERAN.

IACT STOCKHOLM.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA

P: DIRECTOR 488309

IDEN: GEORGE CAVE. RVW 3 AUG 99 DRV DSC-1. ALL SECRET
E C R E T
ET
2646



S E C R E T 3[illegible]Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 6[illegible]

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL AJAJA RYBAT/SDPLOD

1. ADLESICK HAD INITIAL MEETING WITH SDPLOD EVENIN[illegible] 30 AUGUST. FIRST QUESTION WAS WHY HAD SDPLOD/1 BEEN ASSI[illegible] STOCKHOLM IN THE FIRST PLACE. P/1 SAID THAT HE WILL NOT [illegible] STOCKHOLM LONG. IF IRAN EXCHANGES AMBASSADORS WITH THE U[illegible] STATES IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HE WILL PROBABLY BE ASSIGNED T[illegible] WASHINGTON AS AMBASSADOR. IF THIS DOESN'T WORK OUT, HE [illegible] RETURN TO TEHRAN AND TAKE ANOTHER JOB WITH THE GOVERNMENT[illegible]

2. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT HE HAS ONLY TWO ASSIGNMENTS IN [illegible] STOCKHOLM. THE FIRST IS TO REESTABLISH THE LIAISON WITH[illegible] REACTION. THE GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN HAD FELT THAT IT WOU[illegible] EASIER TO NEGOTIATE THE ARRANGEMENTS OUTSIDE OF TEHRAN. ([illegible] DISCUSSIONS WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE CABLE.) P/1 SAI[illegible] HIS OTHER MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ATTEMPT TO GET AS MA[illegible] IRANIANS AS POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND [illegible] TO IRAN. HE SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME TRAVELLING AND SPEA[illegible] TO LARGE GROUPS OF IRANIANS.

3. QUESTIONED SDPLOD/1 ON SHAPUR BAKHTIAR. HE SAID [illegible] ONE OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES WAS TO REPORT ON POLITICAL A[illegible] AMONG EXPATRIATE IRANIANS. WITH REGARD TO BAKHTIAR, HE [illegible] YET BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP ANY GOOD SOURCES. HE BELIEVE[illegible] THE BAKHTIAR PHENOMENA IS MOSTLY TALK. IF THERE WAS AN[illegible] ORGANIZATION GOING ON, HE IS SURE HE WOULD HAVE HEARD [illegible] (WILL INCLUDE MORE ON BAKHTIAR IN SEPARATE DISSEM.)

4. P/1 SAID THAT ONCE REACTION BACK IN CONTACT WITH [illegible] HIS INTEL REQ[illegible] WILL END. BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD WELCOME [illegible] CONTACT WITH REACTION AND ADLESICK WILL ASSESS WHETHER [illegible] WOULD BE WORTHWHILE.

5. [illegible] DEFER. DTG 31AUG79 DRV DPCL

S E C R E T

BT

#6093



S E C R E T 3[illegible]Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUC[illegible]

CITE LONDON 17413 (SHIPLING ACTING). SECTIO[illegible]

TO: WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM.

FOR: CHIEF, NE INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/IRAN, COS, [illegible] COS, STOCKHOLM

SUBJECT: WINTEL FBI AJAJA RYBAT/OPS MEETING

1. SDPLOD/1 AND ADLESICK DISCUSSED THE RE[illegible] ACTIVITIES ON 30 AND 31 AUGUST. AS A MEASURE [illegible] THEY ATTACH TO THE RESUMPTION OF LIAISON, SDP[illegible] AFTER THE 30 AUGUST MEETING. SDPLOD/1 EMPHAS[illegible] TO RESUME THE LIAISON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND [illegible] ABLE IMPORTANCE TO OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER [illegible] THE LIAISON. SDPLOD/1 UNDERSCORED HIS REMARKS [illegible] THEY FULLY REALIZED THAT IN THEY WERE GOING TO [illegible] MOVING AGAIN, THEY WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE [illegible] ASSISTANCE. THEY WERE FRANKLY CONCERNED THAT [illegible] THE UNITED STATES TO DEVELOP A POSITION IN IRA[illegible] ABLE TO MANIPULATE THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. T[illegible] LIKE TO PROCEED AT THEIR OWN PACE AND IN SUCH [illegible] NO UNDUE U.S. INFLUENCE OVER INTERNAL IRANIAN [illegible] SAID THAT THE AKHUNS WERE GOING TO CAUSE A PRO[illegible] IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AS THEY WERE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED [illegible] FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN IRAN. THEY WERE ALSO UNA[illegible] THE BASIC FACT THAT IRAN WAS GOING TO NEED EXTE[illegible] ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT [illegible] THUS WHATEVER IS DONE WILL HAVE TO BE DONE SLO[illegible] CREATE UNDUE POLITICAL STRESS. SDPLOD/1 POINTE[illegible] MOMENT THE DECLINE IN CLERICAL INFLUENCE WAS PR[illegible] BAZERGAN AND HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE W[illegible] MONTHS. BUT HE CONCEDED THAT IT COULD TAKE TWO [illegible] POINTED OUT THAT IF THE CLERICS WON A MAJORITY [illegible] ELECTIONS, IT WOULD TAKE MUCH LONGER FOR THE GO[illegible] ITSELF. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THE ONE PLUS IS THA[illegible] OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENT AN[illegible] NEED FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.



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2. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT IN SEEKING TO RESU
SINCE THEY HAD DEALT WITH US IN THE PAST AND
THE RELATIONSHIP. THEY WERE HOPEFUL THAT OTH
HANDLED VIA THE LIAISON THAT WERE NOT SPECIF
INTELLIGENCE LIAISON. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT TH
UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND IDEAS
HANDLE VARIOUS PROBLEMS. ADLESICK TOLD SDPL
RESUMED THE LIAISON IT WOULD BE FOR INTELLIGE
URGED SDPLOD/1 TO DISCUSS THIS WITH BAZERGAN
THAT THEY BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE CHARGE IM
DILEMMA FACING NEW GOVERNMENT IS THAT AS IND
WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE US IN GENERAL AND R
LAW, BUT ARE FACED WITH A POPULATION HEADY WI

3. ADLESICK SUGGESTED THAT HE AND SDPLOD/
OF RE-ESTABLISHING A LIAISON. THEN WE COULD FU
THE APPROVAL OF OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.
THIS AND ADDED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY MADE THE
ESTABLISH THE LIAISON. ADLESICK TOLD SDPLOD/
OF VIEW, THE LIAISON WOULD HAVE TO BE IN TEHRA
TO BE COVERT M SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD
IT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST THAT THE FACT OF THE
SECRET. BAZERGAN HAD ALREADY TOLD MEHDI CHAMR
HANDLE THE LIAISON DIRECTLY IN TEHRAN ONCE IT
SDPLOD/1 ADDED THAT CHAMRAN HAD BEEN THE FOURTH
BE AT THE BRIEFING, BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO M
KURDISTAN.

4. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY HAD CONSIDERED
NIO AS A GOOD START. THEY HAD BEEN PLEASED WIT
IT HAD ANSWERED SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THEY HAD
SUBJECT MATTER BRIEFED. TOLD SDPLOD/1 THAT WE
QUESTIONS PUT TO THE BRIEFER BY DR. YAZDI AND H
LOT OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE INTERESTED IN
THROUGH PROJECT IBEX. EPHIATUS ALSO HAD A SIGIM
HAD BEEN VALUABLE IN THE PAST. SDPLOD/1 SAID TH
IBEX BUT WAS UNAWARE OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE
GAVE HIM A GENERAL BRIEFING ON IBEX SYSTEM CAPAB
THEN ASKED IF WE COULD PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON IBE
GESTED THAT SDPLOD/1 AND OTHER SENIOR MEMBERS OF



PAGE 3 LONDON 17443 S E C R E T

GET A BRIEFING FROM AIRFORCE OFFICERS INVOLVE
ADLESICK NAMED BG ASREJADID AS HAVING HEADED
MENTIONED COL. JALALI AS BEING WELL VERSED IN
ABILITIES. ADLESICK ADDED THAT IN THIS WAY
ING AN SUSPICION ON THE PART OF THE BAZERGAN
MAY WISH TO MISLEAD THEM WITH REGARD TO IBEX.
ASREJADID'S NAME AND ALSO JALALI'S HE SAID T
LIKE TO HAVE OUR VIEWS AS THEY WERE NOT SURE
WORTHY THE AIR FORCE ACTUALLY IS (ADLESICK TH
AN INTERESTING ADMISSION). SDPLOD/1 SAID THA
TO TEHRAN FOR ANY DISCUSSIONS ON RESUMING THE
NOT WANT ANYTHING TOO TECHNICAL, ALTHOUGH WITH
ING BACKGROUND HE COULD UNDERSTAND TECHNICAL D
WELL. HE SUGGESTED THAT ADLESICK FORWARD SUCH
THROUGH COS, STOCKHOLM WHO WAS INTRODUCED TO S
MEETING. HE RECOMMEND THAT WE SEND SDPLOD/1 BRIE
IBEX CAPABILITIES. HE SAID THAT HE HAD PERSON
AND SEEM INTERESTED IN THE DEDICATED COMMO THAT

5. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE TIMING OF HOLDIN
TEHRAN PROVIDING BOTH SIDES AGREE ON RE-ESTABLI
SOMETIME IN EARLY OCTOBER WAS AGREED UPON. WE
DISCUSSIONS COULD BE HELD AS PART OF ANOTHER BR
SAID THAT THEY WOULD APPRECIATE A BRIEFING ON O
THIS COULD BE DONE. HE INSISTED THAT ADLESICK
HANDLE DISCUSSION ON RESUMING LIAISON. HE POINT
ADLESICK WELL KNOWN TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES IN TE
SUGGESTED THAT WE BRING A TECHNICAL PERSON CAPAB
ING IBEX AND THE SITES (SEE BELOW) AS THEY WOULD
OUR ASSISTANCE IN CRANKING UP IBEX TO ITS CAPABI
SPOKE IN TERMS OF A THREE OR TWO MAN TEAM, A BRI
TECHNICAL EXPERT. WE AGREED THAT ON THE LIAISON
MINICATIONS WITH HIM THROUGH COS, STOCKHOLM. SDPLO
SHOULD NOTIFY HIM AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ANY
IN TEHRAN, SO THAT HE COULD CONFIRM THE TIMING
TEHRAN TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. HE PO
ELECTIONS COULD INTERFERE WITH TIMING OF MEETING.

6. THE AXMAN SITES WERE DISCUSSED AS PART OF
FLINT CAPABILITY. ADLESICK POINTED OUT THAT AT T



PAGE 4 LONDON 17443 S E C R E T
THE DOWNFALL OF THE SHAH. WE WERE IN THE PROCE
TWO ILEX VANS AT SITE ONE. ADDITIONALLY, THE
CONSIDERABLE INTELLIGENCE OF GREAT VALUE TO I
WITH REGARD TO SOVIET CAPABILITIES. ADLESICK
HE WOULD BE NAIVE INDEED NOT TO MENTION TO SDP
WE PLACED IN THE SITES AS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTI
THAT HE KNEW THAT THE AIR FOUANDING THE SITES
THEY HAD NOT LET ANYONE INTO THEM, PENDING A
WOULD BE DONE WITH THEM. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT SH
FRIEND HE WOULD BE WILLING TO FUNCTION AS A FRI
GETTING REACTION ACCESS TO THE SITES. HE SUGG
VIDE HIM WITH WHATEVER BRIEFS ON THE SITES THAT
TO THE BETTINGS IN TEHRAN. HE SAID THAT AT THI
SPECULATION WHAT THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMEN
REGARD TO REACTION ACCESS TO THE SITES. KNOWLE
OF SDPLOD/1'S BASED ON HIS ASSUMPTION SITES WOUL
MORE, SO THERE MIGHT BE SOME ROOM FOR NEGOTIATIO

7. MEETING BROKE UP ON FOND REMEMBERANCES OF
MANY YEARS AGO. IT APPEARS THAT THE FACT THAT W
FACTS WITH THEM IN CONFIDENCE HAS HELPED US AND
SON THAT THE BAZERGAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPROACHED
TATIVELY SET UP A MEETING FOR MORNING OF 1 SEPT.
NOTED AN INTEREST IN HIM IN THE LOBBY OF HOTEL I
DEVELOPED FROM FACT THAT SDPLOD/1 HAS AN IRANIAN
BODYGUARD. THEREFORE NO MEETING HELD.

8. FILE SDPLOD/1 201. RVW 06 SEP 89, DAV D

DS COMMENT RELAYED INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM PER W
S E C R E T



6 Sep 79

S E C R E T 061835Z SEP 79 DERFERRED TELEPOUCH
CITE LONDON 174 [illegible] SHIKLING ACAUNGX
TO: WASHINGTON, INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM.
FOR: CHIEF, NE IMRO, RCNE/BAO, NE/IRAN, COS,
COS, STOCKHOLM
SUBJECT: UNITEL FGI AYBAT AJAJA - ADLESICK
MEETINGS WITH SDPLOD/1

1. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT TO BE
THE TWO MEETINGS BETWEEN SDPLOD/1 AND ADLESICK
OF REESTABLISHING RAPPORT. IT IS QUITE CLEAR
COMPANY HOLD REACTION IN HIGH REGARD. THE FACT
COVERT CONTACT WITH REACTION AND THIS NEVER OOZ
IRANIANS HAS NO DOUBT HELPED. SDPLOD/1 EMPHASIZ
AGAIN THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEAL THROUGH REAC
TIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. AT THE SAME TIME
LEARNED ABOUT HOW WE ARE ASSESSING THE SITUATION
MARKED ABOUT REACTION'S ABILITY TO BRING EVERYT
ADLESICK ASSURED HIM THAT IF THINGS CAME APART
WE FROM THEIR OWN MISTAKES NOT ANYTHING THAT WE

2. SDPLOD GAVE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF HOW MAR
MILITARY IS CURRENTLY WEAK THE GOVERNMENT IS. SENIOR OF
TEHRAN WORK ROUND THE CLOCK. HE SPENT FIVE DAYS
LAST TRIP AND OUTSIDE OF THE BRIEFING ONLY S
FOR ONE HOUR. THE POLITICAL WEAKNESS OF THE GOV
ADDED IMPORTANCE TO THE PERSON OF KHOMEINI. SDP
SAID THAT THEY HOPED AND PRAYED THAT NOTHING WOULD
SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY NOW CONCLUDED THAT KHOMEI
FOR AND HERE 3 TO 5 YEARS IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM T
DATE. HE WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD KEEP IN AND
SUPPORT FOR A GIVEN POLICY. HE CITED THE EXAMPLE
AND ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY. SDPLOD/
KHOMEINI AS THE IMAM IN EVERY INSTANCE WHERE HE
ALSO SPOKE IN RATHER REVERENT TERMS. WHO KNOWS, P
MAHDI HAS RETURNED.



PAGE 2 LONDON 17450 S E C R E T

3. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT KHOMEINI HAS NO PART
ADVISORS IN QUM. HE PRETTY MUCH KEEPS HIS OWN
PROBLEM IS THAT HE IS EXPOSED TO CLERICS CONTI
THE WEEK AND IT DOES INFLUENCE HIS THINKING.
SPEND A LOT OF TIME THINKING UP WAYS OF TRYING
TO MOVE FROM QUM TO TEHRAN WHERE THEY CAN GET
FLUENCE OF THE CLERICS AND WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF HIS NATIONAL POPULARITY.

4. AT ONE POINT WE DISCUSSED THE TUDEH PART
A MARXIST MOVEMENT GROWING IN IRAN. SDPLOD/1
AVERAGE IRANIAN WOULD BE HARD TO ATTRACT TO
PARTY. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY FELT THAT THE
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO DEPT. 2 OF SDJANUS CO
SAID THAT THE TUDEH AND MARXISTS WERE ONLY IN A
PLOT SOMETHING BEING DONE BY OTHERS. HE GAVE
THE CASE OF KHOMEINI PONDERING THE WEARING OF TH
DEMONSTRATION MOUNTED BY FEMALES AGAINST THE CH
IN ITSELF WAS NOT CONNECTED TO
THE MARXIST OR THE TUDEH, BUT THEY HAD TRIED T
THIS DIMENSION TO GIVE IT A MARXIST CAST.
THAT THEY WERE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT CURRENT DAPA
TUDEH AND MARXISTS OR THE SOVIETS ABILITY TO CO
ACTIVITIES, BUT RATHER THE FUTURE ABILITY OF THE
IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THEY AR
SOVIETS WILL BE HOSTILE TO THEM AND WORRIED ABOU
FLUENCE OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC ON THEIR BORDERS.
THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN.

5. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT THERE WAS HOPE IN THE
THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD RECOGNIZE THE ISLA
CERT. ADLESICK POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD RECOGNIZE
ND IT HAD NOT BEEN AN IMPEDENCE TO GOOD RELATIO
PPEARS SOME CONCERN ON HIS PART THAT THE DELAY
MBASSADORS SOMEHOW SIGNALS AMERICAN DISPLEASU
EPUBLIC. HE HOPED THAT AMBASSADORS COULD BE EXC
MMEDIATE FUTURE.



PAGE 3 LONDON 17460 S E C R E T

6. SDPUTTY/1 AND OTHERS CAME UP DURING THE
CUSSIONS. SDPLOD/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTACT
HE HEARS OF ANY FIRM TRAVEL PLANS FOR SDPUTTY/

7. OUR PARTING WAS VERY AMIABLE, AND WHAT
THE FUTURE, SDPLOD/1 AGREED THAT WE SHOULD
CONTACT UNTIL THE LIAISON IN TEHRAN IS WELL
SDPLOD/1 AGREED. WE WILL HAVE TO LOOK INTO THE
BE A GOOD IDEA TO SEE HIM ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE
NOT HAVE TO CONTEND WITH HIS BODYGUARDS OF AT L
HIS IRANIAN BODYGUARD.

8. FILE: SDPLOD/1 201. RVW 96 SER 05 DOW
CDS COMMENT: RELSHED INFO TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM PLA
S E C R E T



E T 130 5Z SEP 79 DELIVERED TELEPHONE

TE WASHINGTO 9125/98

TEHRAN.

OM: CIE/IRAN

UBJECT: VINTEL RYBAT SDPLOD

1. PLS BE SURE TO IDENTIFY FOR CHANGE ON CONTINUING BASIS THOSE INTEL REPORTS ACQUIRED FROM SDPLOD/1. I WOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO BRIEF HIM ON RESULTS OF ADLESICK'S RECENT MEETINGS WITH PGI S THEY PERTAIN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEL RELATIONSHIP WITH PCO.

2. ADLESICK RETURNED TO WASHINGTON AFTER LAINGEN LEFT FOR TEHRAN. THE FORMER WOULD LIKE LAINGEN TO KNOW WE REGRET NOT HAVING BEEN ABLE TO BRIEF HIM HERE ON THE STOCKHOLM MEETINGS.

3. NO FILE. RVW 12SEP99/DRV/D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T



2 SEP 79

S E C R E T 21135Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 26[illegible]

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL RYBAT PGI AJAJA SDPLOD

REF: LONDON 17443

1. SDPLOD/1 ("M[illegible] EDWARD") CALLED COS WHEN COS RETURNED CALL, HE STEP HE LEAVING STOCKHOLM 5 OCTOBER FOR TEHRAN AND RETURNING STOCKHOLM ON 11 OCT. HE ASKED WHETHER TEHRAN BRIEFING (PARA 5 REF) COULD TAKE PLACE BEGINNING 6 OR 7 OCT.

2. COS REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED WORD ON TIMING BUT WOULD INQUIRE. SDPLOD/1 EXPECTING REPLY NEXT WEEK. PLEASE ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-962[illegible]54. RVW 21 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T

BT

#6199



23 Sep

S E C R E T 221719Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 519293.

TO: PRIORITY STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI AJAJA SDPLOD

REF: STOCKHOLM 26199

1. REQUEST COS CONTACT SDPLOD/1 AND INFORM HIM THAT WE
WILL HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY MAKING DATES SUGGESTED/REF. WE WILL
HAVE BRIEFINGS READY IN TIME FOR ADLESICK TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN
ON OR ABOUT 14 OCTOBER. PLEASE ASK SDPLOD/1 IF HE CAN LET ISS
SCHEDULE SLIP ONE WEEK AND EMPHASIZE THAT WE WILL BE ABLET TO
DO MUCH BETTER GIVEN ADDITIONAL WEEK TO PREPARE.

2. FYI: IF SDPLOD/1 INSISTS ON 6-7 OCTOBER FOR BRIEFI
WE PREPARED TO ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE, BUT POINT OUT TO HIM
ALL MATERIALS NEEDED FOR BRIEFINGS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE/THA
SOON. ADDITIONALLY, ADLESICK AND OTHER BRIEFER HAVE COMMIT
MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN ON 5 OCTOB

3. PLEASE ADVISE SDPLOD/1 REPLY ON PRIORITY BASIS.

4. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 22 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL

S E C R E T
BT
#5532



25 Sep 79

S E C R E T 250908Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 26210

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT FGI AJAJA SDPLOD

REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 26199
B. DIRECTOR 519293

1. AFTER SOME PERSUASION, SDPLOD/1 AGREED TO DELAY
BRIEFING UNTIL 14 OCTOBER SO AS TO GET MORE COMPLETE AND
THOROUGH PRESENATION. COS TOLD HIM WE WOULD CONFIRM DATE.

2. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN DATE FIRM.

3. FILE: 201-962054. RVW 25 SEP 99 DRV [illegible].
S E C R E T



FM STOCKHOLM 20284

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

SDPLOD/1 SAID BRIEFINGS STILL ON AND HE HAD NO INVITE FR
TEHRAN WHICH WOULD CHANGE THIS CONCLUSION. AS USUAL, HE PLEAS
AND POLITE ON PHONE.

2. HE THOUGHT THERE WD PROBLEM GETTING VISAS IN WASHINGTON A
CPOUGH IT OBVIOUSLY EASIER HERE THROUGH HIM. IN ADDITION TO BUSINE
WITH IN STOCKHOLM FOR PARIS
FRIDAY, OCTOBER BECAUSE SDPLOD/1 DEPARTING
OCTOBER AND HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE INSTRUCTIONS RE VISAS. HE DI
NOT THINK IT NECESSARY FOR AOLESICK TO COME FROM TEHRAN FOR
BEFORE TSHRAN MEETING.

3. SDPLOD/1 DEPARTING PARIS FOR STOCKHOLM ON 8 OR 9 OCTOBER.
THEREFORE WANTS TEHRAN BRIEFING TO BE HELD BY OCTOBER 7
HIM NOT TO AVOID WASTING HIS TIME" IN TEHRAN.

4. IF MATERIAL IN REFTEL NO. 507786 (REF B) ARRIVES STOCKHOLM
FRIDAY 5 OCTOBER, HOULE WILL PASS IT TO SDPLOD/1 PRESUMABLY WILL EITHER LEAVE
CONSIDERATIONS SINCE SDPLOD/1 CARRY IT WITH HIM TO PARIS. IF YOU PREFER
TERRIAL IN OFFICE OR CARRY IT WITH HIM TO PARIS. ANY SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS RE HANDLIN
SAGE SHOULD BE GIVEN HIM.

FILE: 201-982054.

RMW, 320CT79 DRV DOC.I

24



25

Real Name: Bahram Bahramian.

Code Name: S. D. Arne/1.

According to the documents of the C. I. A., Bahramian was a member of the High Command of the Liberation Movement Organization and a friend of Bazargan. In June 1977 he was employed by the C. I. A. as a single channel of information for passing secrets about the so-called terrorist activities and about the opponents of the regime in Iran. In the beginning this co-operation with the C. I. A. was based on the understanding that he would pass word to the U. S. government about the views of his moderate political party through a certain channel with the hope that the U. S. government would do something for his party as a result of these contacts and for his support to the government of the Shah. He was of course prohibited from disclosing to his colleagues anything about his contacts with the C. I. A. After the Revolution, he desired to promote a perfectly open system in Iran and had the feeling that the U. S. government could play a significant role in this regard. For a long time he refused to accept any salary, but after Khurdad (June) he signed a memorandum of commitment and agreed to receive a salary, according to which the C. I. A. had to pay the instalments of his life insurance policy -- an amount equivalent to $100000 and to deposite $5000 anually in an indirect bank account. He was given the legal status of a permanent resident of America, and he was promised that he and his family would be given the above mentioned legal status as long as they stayed abroad.

Bahramian was given training in code-writing, code-telecommunication and security system. He possessed wireless transmitter Mx-350, through which the incharge of the C. I. A. station made contacts with him and asked for his help during the Bahman 58 (January 1979), seige of the embassy, after which he informed Yazdi about it. Afterwards the transmitter was taken from him by the C. I. A. and he was given lie-detection tests which he successfully passed.

His principal reports were about the leadership of the provisional government, Revolutionary Council and the clergy, which were of extreme value to the C. I. A., and he often gained very high marks for his reports. He was the source of information for 67 reports from Dey 57 (December 1978) to Shahrivar 58 (September 1979).

In Bahramian's file, several documents are concerned with the determination of an operational address in England for his use. These documents also indicate that as conditions in Iran worsened the C. I. A. did not find any other means to contact Bahramian except personally receiving information from him in Iran. In order to retain this connection they assigned one of their agents to receive reports from Bahramian, which could be sent under confidential cover by ordinary mail. The name and address of the agent could be seen on the documents.

Afterwards some changes were made regarding the maintenance and care of those technical instruments of communication that were in Bahramian's charge. Subsequently there are certain documents at the end of the file regarding the plans of his possible secret flight from Iran and other such activities for which the C. I. A. had prepared the forged documents for Bahramian in advance.

It is worth mentioning here that the documents related to the Liberation Movement Organization (document 9: book 24.) give an account of the meeting that Muhammad Tawassuli of the Liberation Movement had in the company of one of the officials of the political section of the Espionage Den with this spy (Bahram Bahramian), that was held on Mehr 3, 57 (September 25, 1978). It was he who arranged this meeting on behalf of the Liberation Movement along with Muhammad Tawassuli.

S E C R E T 260716Z MAR 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 52508 (PLANTINGA ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

1. SDURN/1 (U/I) PASSED US RIALS 500,000 ON 25 MARCH 79, WITH A REQUEST THAT THIS AMOUNT BE CONVERTED INTO US DOLLARS AND DEPOSITED IN HIS IDEN ACCOUNT.

2. U/I REQUIRES THE FUNDS AS HIS WIFE HAS BEEN ILL AND WILL TRAVEL TO THE U.S. FOR SURGERY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

3. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL CONVERT ABOVE SUM INTO DOLLARS, AND HQS ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING DEPOSIT DOLLARS INTO IDEN ACCOUNT. FYI, EMBASSY IS CONVERTING RIALS TO DOLLARS AT RATE OF RIALS 74.5 TO U.S. $1. WHILE THIS IS A DIFFERENT RATE THAN RIACTION IS BUYING AT, REQUEST THIS RATE BE USED. IF RIACTION INCURRS A LOSS IN MAKING THIS ACCOMODATION CONVERSION, SUGGEST LOSS, IF NECESSARY, BE RECOVERED FROM FUNDS WE ARE "PAYING" TO U/I.

4. PLS ADVISE IF ACCOMODATION APPROVED, AND DATE CHECK MAILED TO IDEN SO THAT WE MAY INFORM SDURN/1 THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.

5. FILE: DEFER. RVW 26MAR99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 260716Z MAR 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 52509 (PLANTINGA ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

REF: TEHRAN 52508

IDEN: ACCOUNT NO. 09-13301-7
FIRST NATIONAL BANK
TOWN AND COUNTRY OFFICE
FAR HILLS AVENUE
DAYTON
OHIO
45429
(SAVINGS ACCOUNT)

RVW 26MAR99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T



S E C R E T 041704Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE LONDON 13151

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATHTECH, DIRTECH.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 405437

1. WE HAVE RECENTLY OFFERED AN A/A FOR USE FROM LIBYA BY ANOTHER NEAR EAST ASSET (ACWIZARD/1 - SEE LONDON 12969 TO DIRECTOR AND DIRTECH).

2. ACWIZARD/1 WILL BE TESTING THE A/A IN COMING WEEKS AND WE WILL HAVE CHANCE TO SEE HOW WELL IT WORKS. ACWIZARD/1 WILL USING ADDRESS REGULARLY AND FREQUENTLY WHILE UNDERSTAND THAT SDURN/1 WILL BE USING ONLY ON A WORST CASE BASIS. THEREFORE, IN ALL JUDGMENT IS THAT A/A SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE BOTH AGENTS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. WE ARE CHECKING INTO PPOSSIBILITY OF GETTING POST OFFICE BOX USE AS A/A, BUT THIS STILL NOT ACCOMPLISHED. SUGGEST THAT SAME RESS GIVEN ACWIZARD/1 BE GIVEN TO SDURN/1.

FILE: 201-949163, RVW 04 APR 99 RVD

S E C R E T

7 APR 79 02 24Z

S E C R E T 0620002 APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 414499.

TO: LONDON INFO TEHRAN, ATHTECH, DIRTECH.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: LONDON 13151

1. HAVE NO OBJECTION TO UTILZATIONOF SAME AA FOR SDURN AND ACWIZARD/1. SUGGEST THAT NAME GIVEN SDURN/1 SHOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM, OR VARIANT OF, NAME GIVEN ACWIZARD/1. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER.

3. FILE: 201-949163, RVW 5APR99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#2772

9 APR 79 17 19Z

S E C R E T 091709Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE LONDON 13295

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATHTECH, DIRTECH.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 414499

1. RECOGNIZING PRINCIPLE IN QUESTION, FROM OUR VIEWPOINT WOULD NEVERTHELESS OPT FOR USING SAME NAME. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF DOING SO LIES ONLY IN HOPE THAT NAME WILL BECOME FAMILIAR TO POSTMAN, FURTHER SUPPORTING NORMAL LOCAL PRACTICE OF DELIVERING MAIL TO ADDRESS RATHER THAN TO NAME OF KNOWN OCCUPANT. WE WOULD HOPE THAT MAIL FROM IRAN WOULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM MAIL FROM LIBYA AND VICE VERSA. USE OF DIFFERENT NAMES COULD LEAD POSTMAN TO WONDER HOW MANY PEOPLE HE HASN'T SEEN ACTUALLY LIVE THERE. WE FORESEE NO PROBLEM WITH JUST ONE. (WE PLAN MANY PERIODIC MAILINGS OF LETTERS FROM PARTS OF U.K. AND OTHER COUNTRIES, AS CHANCES PRESENT THEMSELVES, TO FURTHER OBFUSCATE MATTER.)

2. UNLESS HOS THINKS POSSIBILITY OF ONE SOURCE'S BECOMING SLOWLY WITH RESULTANT PUBLICITY INCLUDING NAME AND ADDRESS OF A/A, IS PIF GREATER THAN WHAT WE SEE AS ADDED SECURITY AT THIS END, SUGGEST THAT NAME ISSUED TO SDURN BE SAME SURNAME, BUT WITH FIRST NAME LIKE "JOHN" OR "JAMES" INSTEAD OF INITIAL ONLY USED BY AGWIZARD/I.

3. THIS IS TEHRAN/HOS OP. DEFER FOR FINAL DECISION TO YOU. PLS ADVISE.

4. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 9 APR 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T

12 APR 79 16 46Z

S E C R E T 121353Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE LONDON 13425

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN INFO DIRTECH, ATHTECH.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 417068

1. SUGGEST INDICATOR OF ESSENCE OF SW MESSAGE WOULD BE USE OF DDLE INITIAL "S."

2. TEHRAN: ADDRESS WHICH MAY BE GIVEN SDURN IS IDEN-

3. FILE: 201-949163. RV 12 APR 99 DRV D9C.1.

E C R E T



12 Apr 79

S E C R E T 121447Z APR 79 STA

CITE LONDON 3426

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN INFO DIR[illegible] ADMTECH.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: LONDON 3425

1. IDEN: MR. JAMES S. RAFF[illegible]Y RAFFERTY
NI 35 RPT 35 WHITE L[illegible]E PT LEDGES
EALING W13 RPT WI
LONDON SUB RPT SU

2. RVW 12 APR 99 DRV D9C.1.
S E C R E T

4 APR 79 1 55Z

S E C R E T 141421Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 419468. SECTION 1 OF 4

TO: ROME INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJALA BOHAWK.

REF: TEHRAN 52649

1. PER REF REQUEST, FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF CASES WHICH MAY BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE IN TEHRAN:

C. [illegible] U/I (U/D, AGE 39, FORMER STUDENT ACTIVIST AGAINST SHAH, [illegible]OUP AND BUSINESSMAN, WAS RECRUITED IN JUNE 1977 AS UNILATERAL ASSET REPORTING ON TERRORIST AND DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. SUBJECT WAS A MEMBER OF THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF [illegible]RATION FRONT AND IS A FRIEND OF THE PRESENT [illegible]INISTER. AS THE SITUATION IN IRAN DETERIORATED U/I'S MOTIVAT[illegible] IS TO SEE A COMPLETELY FREE POLITICAL SYSTEM EVOLVE IN IRA[illegible] AND FEELS THE USG HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY. HE IS AVOWEDL[illegible]TI-COMMUNIST. U/I IS ALSO A PRA AND THAT PLAYS A ROLE IN HIS [illegible]OTIVATION. HE HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT A SALARY BUT WE MAINTA[illegible] HQS ASSIGNED ACCOUNT AND LIFE INSURANCE POLICY FOR HIM SO RE[illegible] PRESERVE HIS PRA STATUS WHILE OUT OF THE U.S. ALSO WE HAVE [illegible]LED AN ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE FOR HIM AND HAVE PROMISED TO P[illegible]OCT THE PRA STATUS OF HIMSELF AND HIS FAMILY. U/I HAS BEEN [illegible]INED IN SECURITY PRACTICES AND HAS BEEN MEETING UNDER [illegible]CLANDESTINE CONDITIONS WHILE HE HAS BEEN IN TEHRAN. HE HA[illegible] ALSO BEEN TRAINED IN SR AND ASSIGNED AN AA IN LONDON. A[illegible]URIZATION HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR USE OF CLANDESTINE COMMO GEAR. [illegible]VIOUSLY, AS OF 14 MARCH 79 HE DID NOT HAVE ANY RADIO EQUIPME[illegible] IN HIS POSSESSION.

11 APR 79 16 32Z

S E C R E T 1 1551Z APR 79 STATE

CITE DIRECTOR [illegible] 7868.

TO: LONDON INFO TEHRAN, ATHENS, DIRTECH.

UNITED RYBAT PLSDURN TECHS

REF: LONDON [illegible] 5

1. WE AGREE WITH YOUR THINKING AND CONCUR IN SUGGESTION THAT AME ISSUE SDURN/1 REF SAFE SURNAME, BUT WITH FIRST NAME "JAMES" WRITTEN OUT INSTEAD OF INITIAL "J" ONLY, WHICH USED BY ACWIZARD/1. OUR ONE THOUGHT HAS BEEN TO AVOID CONFUSION BETWEEN MARKS REF OBSCURED, OR BOTH AS HAPPENED MAIL LETTERS FROM SAFE LOCALE. AS ACWIZARD/1 HAS NO SW INDICATORS OTHER THAN ADDRESS, PHARS ADDITIONAL SW INDICATOR SHOULD BE GIVEN SDURN/1.

S E C R E T 3. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 10 APR 99 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET

1 May 79 [illegible]Z

S E C R E T 30215[illegible]Z APR 79 STATE

CITE DIRECTOR 4[illegible]

TO: TEHRAN

UNITED PLSDURN

REF: TEHRAN 52718

1. NOTEING FURTHER DESIRED OF STATION ON SDURN/1 TO [illegible] APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE FOR NATURALIZATION. WHEN WE RECEIVE APPLICATION FORM, WILL FORWARD IT WITH MEMO TO HQS ALIEN AFFAIRS OFFICE REQUESTING THEY TAKE ACTION TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM INS TO PROVIDE SDURN/1 WITH APPROPRIATE BENEFITS. WILL ADVISE WHEN INS APPROVAL RECEIVED.

S E C R E T 2. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 30 APRIL 1999 DRV DSC.1 ALL SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible]
4303[illegible]

S E C R E T 131058Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE HRTEAN 53436 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

TO: IOPRRITY DIRECTOR.

WNINT SELDURN INTEL

REF: EH TRAN 53434 (NIT-10,643

1. 1 SDURN/1 ACQUIRED INFO PARAS TWO-THREE REF FROM BAZARGAN, AND IG MFPARA FOUR FROM MUSTAFA C H A M R A N.

2. 2 AT MEETING AT WHICH REF ACQUIRED, SDURN/1 WAS MORE GLOOMY THAN HWEAVE YET SEEN HIM ON THE FUTURE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION. U/I IPES RSONALLY VERY FATIGUED AND FRUSTRATED, WORKING LONG HOURSO TCOME UP WITH PROGRAMS AND COURSES OF ACTION WHICH HE SEES PAS ROPER AND REALISTIC, ONLY TO FIND SUCH HARD WORK UNDONE (OR ALET AST SET BACK) BY A SINGLE UTTERANCE FROM KHOMEINI AND/OR THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. WE HAVE FOUND U/I INCREASINGLY CYNICAL. ALL TS HIHAS AFFECTED HIS PRODUCTION, SINCE HE HAS LESS TIME NOW TO SPD ENWITH US AND TENDS NOT TO BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF WHAT GOES ON ISP OANY REAL SIGNIFICANCE.

3. 3 U/I IS A "BIG-PICTURE" MAN, AND IS MOST AT HOME WITH SITUAGNTIS SUCH AS WERE OCCURRING LAST FALL AND WINTER WHEN HIS COOPETIRACN WITH STATION WAS SIGNIFICANT IN A POLITICAL ACTION CONTE. XT HE IS DEPRESSED BY INDICATIONS THAT THE USG IS NOT INCLID NETO TAKE INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN; AND A IS ESPECIALLY STRESSED BY OUR RELUCTANCE TO SEND A SPECI EALNVOY TO KHOMEINI. HE NOW IS BEGINNING TO WONDER, WE THINKWHO, W USEFUL A ROLE HE IS PLAYING IN HIS COOPERATION WITH US. HE NOTHNEELESS ACCEPTED CONTACT PLAN FOR MEETING NEW CASE OFFICER EARLYUL JY (SEE SEPARATE CABLE) AND GIVES NO INDICATION YET THAT HE ISOI GNG TO BAIL OUT. U/I IS AN EXTREMELY BRIGHT MAN, BUT AS ESSENALTILY A VISIONARY HE IS BECOMING VERY IMPATIENT WITH THE RIGIDY ITOF SOME OF THE DOGMATISTS HE MUST WORK WITH.

4. 4 FILE: 201-949163. RWW 13 JUN 99 DRV DS C.I. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 141041Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53449 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

1. FOLLOWING IS RECONTACT PLAN FOR SDURN/1

A. DURING FIRST WEEK JULY, PAQUIN CAN CALL SDURN/1 AT IDEN OR IDEN B PHONE NUMBERS. IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS "BRIEND OF MR. WILLIAMS". HE CAN MENTION CONTRACTS FOR MOBILE RURAL HOSPITALS, AND SUGGEST MEETING. WHATEVER DAY AGREED UPON, PAQUIN SHOULD BE WALKING NORTH ON STREET NEAR VENETTO PIZZA RESTAURANT PERPENDICULAR MEHR-E-SHAH STREET. MAP OF LOCATION IS IN SDURN/1 FILE. U/I WILL PICK PAQUIN UP IN LIGHT GREEN VW (ONE OF THE VERY FEW OF ITS KIND IN TOWN). TIME OF MEETING IS 2030.

B. IF U/I WISHES TO MAKE CONTACT FIRST, HE WILL CALL EMBASSY EXTENSION 1186 OR 1133 AND ASK TO SPEAK TO "TOM". HE WILL IDENTIFY SELF AS "BRIAN". REMAINDER OF PARA 1A ARRANGEMENT IS THE SAME.

2. FILE: 201-949163. RWW 9 JUN 99 DRV DS C.I. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 141841Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53458 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR

WINN EL RYBAT PLSDURN

REF: TEHRAN 53449

1. IDEN A IS 247-214 RPT 247-214 (HOME PHO
IDEN B IS 841162 RPT 841162 (OFFICE PHO

2. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 9 JUN 95 DRV DD

E C R E T

SECRET



S E C R E T 140753Z JUL 79 TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53680

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN INFO DO/NE/AO

SUBJECT: WNINTEL--CONTACT WITH SDURN/1

REF: TEHRAN 53670

1. TEACHED SDURN/1 FROM PAY PHONE EARLY EVENING 13 JULY. DESPITE ITS BEING HOLIDAY, TRAFFIC NOISE INTERFERED WITH COMMUNICATIONS, BUT WE UNDERSTOOD U/I TO SAY THAT HE STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH COMPLICATED BUSINESS TRANSACTION OF SOME SORT. HE CLAIMED THE MATTER TOO COMPLICATED TO EXPLAIN, AND SAID HE WILL CALL US "NEXT WEEK." I WE SAID WE VERY INTERESTED IN SEEING HIM, AND GOT HIS ASSURANCE THAT HE STILL HAS OUR PHONE NUMBER. U/I'S TONE WAS BUSINESSLIKE BUT PLEASANT; IT GAVE NO CLUE AS TO REASON FOR HIS RECENT UNAVAILABILITY, OR HIS INTENTIONS REGARDING FUTURE CONTACT.

2. WILL KEEP HQS ADVISED.

3. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 14JUL99 DRV D9C.1. CL BY 015356.

ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

2 JUN 79 01 58Z

S E C R E T 011953Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 52614

TO: TEHRAN INFO ATHTECH DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AQUATIC EZRALLY EZGOODS

REF: TEHRAN 53277

RE PARA 3 REF, RECOMMEND THAT STATION RETAIN SV/A-8 S/N 619, SV-8 S/N 429 AND SV-8 S/N 341 ALL ON 170.030 RPT 170.330 MHZ FOR SDURN/1 CONTINGENCY. RETURN ALL OTHER UNITS HQS FIA FASTACT CHANNELS. RVW 1 JUN 99 DRV C9C.1.8 BY 198103
S E C R E T

Bill-Jerry



S E C R E T 251845Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 53462

TO: TEHRAN INFO ATHTECH, DIRECTOR, HELRAZING

WNINTEL AQUATIC EZRALLY SDURN

REFS: A. TEHRAN 52313 (NOTAL)

B. DIRECTOR 396574 (NOTAL)

1. REF A INDICATED SDURN/1 MX-350 DUP FAIR
HAS UNABLE LOCATE. REPLY TO REF B QUERY WHETHER
BATTERY CHARGER CONCEALED IN SANYO STEREO STILL

2. IN VIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CONTINGENCY REQUIR
SVA/A-8 FOR SDURN/1 PLEASE ADVISE IF REF B CONC
BATTERY CHARGER STILL REQUIRED.

EVT 25 JUN 79 DRV C9CI.S BY 396483.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 3114062 AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 505692.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: CNE/TRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL FLSDURN JECENT

REF: TEHRAN 54055

1. GLAD TO SEE FACE TO FACE CONTACT HAS BEEN REESTABLISHED WITH SDURN/1 (U/1) PER REF.

2. WE HAVE TWO ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY REQUIRE U/1'S SIGNATURE IN ORDER TO COMPLETE HIS INSURANCE AND TAX RECORDS:

A. A SIGNED CERTIFICATION (WHICH STATION MAY DRAW UP) STATING BRIEFLY THAT U/1 UNDERSTANDS THAT NO FEDERAL OR STATE OR SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES WILL BE WITHHELD FROM HIS RTACTION COMPENSATION AND THAT HE WILL NOT ACCRUE ANY SOCIAL SECURITY CREDITS DURING THIS PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT. THIS CERTIFICATION SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO HQS FOR RETENTION SHOULD ANY QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO HIS COMPLIANCE WITH THE IRS REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO HIS RTACTION COMPENSATION.

B. SDURN/1'S INSURANCE POLICY BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION. THIS WILL REQUIRE BOTH HIS SIGNATURE AND NAMES OF HIS DESIGNATED PRIMARY AND CONTINGENCY BENEFICIARIES.

3. WE HAVE DEFERRED POUCHING STATION ITEM (B) IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING RISKS INVOLVED IN MEETING U/1 COMBINED WITH THE RATHER INCRIMINATING NATURE OF THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES. SOLICIT STATION VIEWS ON FEASIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE SIGNATURES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IF RESPONSE POSITIVE, WILL POUCH ITEM (B), BUT IF ANY DOUBTS EXIST, WE CAN AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEFER THIS.

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 325592 S E C R E T
4. FILE: 201-949163, RVW 30AUG99 DRV D9C.3 ALL SECRET
S E C R E T
BT
#7482

Approved for Release: 2015/03/06 C05102682

6 SEP 79 [illegible] 062

S E C R E T 0513317 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FRANKFURT 72861

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR

WNINTEL LOGS TECHS SDURN

REFS: A. TEHRAN 51290
B. TEHRAN 51625
C. TEHRAN 51120

REF C RAPIDOPR NT ACTIVATOR WAS ORDERED BY YOUR STATION VIA REF A ON 23 JAN 79. BECAUSE OF EARLIER DIFFICULTIES IN DELIVERING MATERIAL TO YOUR AREA, IT WAS NOT SHIPPED UNTIL ONLY RECENTLY. PER REF B, THE ACTIVATOR IS FOR USE WITH YOUR ROTORI RAPID PROCESSOR MDL 1494D. WE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER BACK-GROUND. RVW 04SEP99, DRV D9C.3.
S E C R E T
BT
#2381



6 Sept 79

MEMO FOR: SATURN/1 [illegible]e

SUBJECT: Contact Arrangement

1. A brief meeting to be arranged on phone. U/1 will call to BP or [illegible] ask for Tom. Date and time agreed on phone will each be [illegible] two.

2. Site is Suburen St. [illegible] ove Asadena St. and vertical to it. C/O [illegible] I walk north, U/1 DRIVE[illegible] North will [illegible] pick him up.



15 SEP

[illegible] 31647Z SEP 79 DIRECTED TELEPOUCH

CITE ASHINGTON 5A2805.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - SATURN/1 FSAR

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR SUGGESTED FSAR FOR SATURN/1 FOR BRIEFING PERIOD APR/79 - OCT/79. PLEASE MAKE ANY COMMENTS OR CORRECTIONS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE, AND PLEASE SUPPLY INFO REQUESTED SO FSAR CAN BE COMPLETED.

REPORTING PERIOD: APRIL 79 - OCTOBER 79

1. IDENTIFICATION:
   A. SATURN
   B. FLSDUEN/1 - FILE: 201-0549183

2. FAR: 3848AE

3. OBJECTIVE: S

4. OPERATIONAL DATA: S/

A. OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT AND AUTHORIZATIONS/CLEARANCES: FLSDUEN/1 IS AN IRANIAN CITIZEN RESIDENT IN TEHRAN WHO HOLDS U.S. PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. HE IS A CONFIDANT OF MODERATE LEADERS WHO WERE LONGTIME OPPONENTS OF THE SHAH AND ARE NOW SENIOR FIGURES IN THE PGOI, AND HE REPORTS ON THEIR VIEWS AND ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS GENERALLY. POA WAS GRANTED 13 JUNE 77 AND WAS RENEWED 27 MARCH 79.

B. U/1'S ACCESS TO THE CURRENT LEADERS OF THE PGOI IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IN WORKING AGAINST THIS TARGET.

C. CONTACTS AND COMMITMENTS: U/1 ORIGINALLY COOPERATED WITH STATION IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE A CHANNEL FOR HIS MODERATE POLITICAL GROUP'S OPINIONS TO THE U.S., FELT THE POPE TEXT US WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO OPEN CONTACT AND SUPPORT FOR THIS







2. 16/0612Z SEP IS DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

HERAN 54222

SHINGTON.

C/NE/IRAN

CT: UNINTEL//SDURM/I FSAR

WASHINGTON 812306

V. FOLLOWING DATA KEYED TO RE .:

A.D. C/I IS MET FOR CAR PICKUPS, USING EITHER M/S CAR
THAI OR C/O, AS PRE-ARRANGED. SIGNAL FOR MEETING CAN BE
IATED BY PHONE BY EITHER PARTY.

4.E. NO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS HAVE ARISEN SINCE RE-
TABLISHMENT OF CONTACT IN AUGUST '78.

4.F. THERE ARE NO PRESENT PLANS FOR FURTHER TRAINING.

5. STATION PLANS FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF C/I REFLECT THE
TENDENCY OF THE TWO PARALLEL POWER STRUCTURES TO MERGE; WE WILL
EMPHASIZE REPORTING ON THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND ITS ROLE IN
DETERMINING THE ORIENTATION OF THE PGOI AND OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

6.A. OPS EXPENSES: USD 20.

6.C. ONE TENTH.

2. FILES: 201-0545068. WW 16 SEP 78 DIV DSD. I. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: EFFORT BY GROUP INCLUDING AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI TO MERGE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AUTHORITY IN A NEW PROVISIONAL REGIME (DOI: LATE AUGUST 1979)

SOURCE : A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR MEMBER OF AN IRANIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WHO HAS BEEN INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND WHO HAS HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.

1. A NON-GOVERNMENT GROUP HAS BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE PRIME MINISTER MEHDI B A Z A R G A N TO ENDORSE A PLAN WHICH WOULD COMBINE THE SECULAR AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AS PERSONIFIED BY AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I. THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, WHO INCLUDE AYATOLLAH SAYAD MAHMUD T A L E G H A N I, ABDOL B A N I - S A D R, AND EZZED S A H A B I, BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF PARALLEL LINES OF AUTHORITY IS INCAPABLE OF DEALING WITH URGENT PROBLEMS, THAT BAZARGAN IS UNWILLING EVEN TO CONFRONT THESE PROBLEMS, AND THAT KHOMEINI'S PERSONAL AUTHORITY MUST BE MERGED INTO UNIFIED PROVISIONAL GOVERNING STRUCTURE. BAZARGAN, WHO PERCIEVES HIS ROLE AS LIMITED TO PRESIDING OVER THE TRANSFER OF A .....-CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT, HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL, DESPITE HIS CLOSE PERSONAL LINKS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SPONSORING GROUP. IF HE DOES NOT CHANGE HIS MIND DURING THE WEEK OF 26 AUGUST, AND THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT HE WILL, TALEGHANI WILL VISIT QOM OVER THE WEEKEND TO SOLICIT KHOMEINI'S AGREEMENT.

2. THE PROVISIONAL STRUCTURE ENVISIONED BY THE SPONSORING GROUP WOULD HAVE KHOMEINI AS CHAIRMAN OF A GOVERNING "BOARD". BAZARGAN WOULD BE A MEMBER, WHILE SERVING AS THE NEW STRUCTURE'S "SECRETARY GENERAL." ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT CABINET WOULD BE DISMISSED, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DISSOLVED, AND OFFICIALS, SUBORDINATE TO THE GOVERNING BOARD, WOULD BE ASSIGNED FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES SUCH AS DEFENSE, AGRICULTURE, HOUSING

27 SEP 79 04 19Z

S E C R E T 262220Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 521568.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO; NE/INTEL; DPDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR AUGUST: NIT'S 10,700; 10,701; 10,704; 10,707; 10,708 AND 10,709, REVIEWED 25 SEPTEMBER 1979. REMAINING AUGUST NIT'S ARE OIL REPORTS WHICH NE/ECON WILL GRADE SEPARATELY.

OBJ: S.1.B.

NIT-10,704	SDURN	TDFIRDB-315/15168-79 29 AUGUST 1979	RATING: 5
UNILATERAL	SDURN/1	FULL	

SUBJECT: EFFORT BY GROUP INCLUDING AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI TO MERGE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AUTHORITY IN A NEW PROVISIONAL REGIME.

COMMENT: REPORT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT SUBSTANTIATED IN THE PRESS. LATER REPORTING INDICATED THIS GROUP'S PROPOSALS HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN. ANALYSTS REMAIN VERY INTERESTED IN MOVES BY THE CLERGY TOWARD A MORE ACTIVE GOVERNING ROLE. THERE IS GREAT INTEREST IN ANY REPORTING ON THE VIEWS OF THE IRANIAN CLERGY - ANY OF THEM. REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-323



S E C R E T 2710282 SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 54326

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE IRAN

WNINTEL PLSDURN

1. IT WILL NOT HAVE ESCAPED YOU THAT SDURN/1 HAS NOT MADE ANY RECENT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF GOVERNMEN DYNAMICS, INCLUDING THE NAZIH AFFAIR. AT LAST MEETING WE CONSENTED TO U/1 REQUEST THAT NEXT MEETING BE INITIATED BY HIS PHONE CALL. HAVE NOT HEARD FROM HIM, AND OVER LAST THREE DAYS HAVE LEFT MESSAGES AT BOTH HOME AND OFFICE ASKING HIM TO GET IN TOUCH. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

2. FILE: 201-949163. RNW 27 SEP 99 DRV DSC. 1. ALL

SECRET

S E C R E T



S E C R E T 041 50Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54498

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT PLSDURN

REF: TEHRAN 54326

1. REACHED SDURN/1 (U/I) FROM P... EVENING 3 O...
HE SAID:

A. HE CLOSING HIS BUSINESS AND ... RELATIONSHIP
THE PGOI. ASKED IF WE HAD ANY INFO ON ... REPLY, NEGATI...

B. HIS SPOUSE HAS ACQUIRE... GUARD WHOSE
SPONSORSHIP UNKNOWN. THIS DEVELOPMENT ... IBLE FOR
U/I'S FAILURE TO CONTACT THE STATION.

C. HE MUST TRAVEL TO BAL... UP AN UNSPEC...
BUSINESS TRANSACTION. WILL TRY TO CALL ... FROM AIRPORT
RETURN LATE NEXT WEEK.

2. IN VIEW OF SITUATION ... G. WE WERE R...
TANT TO PROLONG CONVERSATION OR ASK ... BEST UNDE...
STANDING IS THAT DECISION TO PU... ENERATED BY ...
SDPUTTY/1 AFFAIR, AND PRECEDED ... THE GUARD AT ...
HIS GATE. U/I SOUNDED DEPRESSED AND ... GHTENED).

3. IN RECENT CALLS TO U/I HOUS... HEARD VOICES ...
SON AND FEMALE WHO IS PRESUMABL... UGHTER. FAC...
THAT FAMILY STILL HERE MAY IN ... IS WIFE NOT ...
ANOTHER SDEAGLE/1 CASE. ... VOLUTIONARY ...
JUSTICE DOES NOT SEEM TO INCLU... T FAMILIES ...
THOSE JUDGED DELINQUENT. AND I... WILL COME ...
CONCLUSION HE MUST ATTEMPT SOLO ... PARTURE. I REC...
HQS ADVICE AS TO WHETHER WE SHOULD ... SUCH A DEPAR...
AND IF SO WHAT CONTINGENCY PREPARATIO... AKE.

136



S E C R E T 042315Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 526974.

TO: IMMEDIATE FRANTECH. DIRTECH INFO TEHR ...

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA PLSDURN

REF: DIRECTOR 526966

1. IDENTIS:

BAHRAM B A H R A M I A N. SEX: MALE. ...
DPOB 22 APRIL 1940, IRAN. ...
CITIZEN: IRAN. BAHRAMIAN ... U.S. ...
ALIEN (PRA). OCC: BUSINESSMAN. ...
DESCRIPTION: HEIGHT: 70 INCHES; WEIGHT ...
COMPLEXION: OLIVE; FACIAL CHARACTERISTICS ...
FACE WITH LARGE NOSE, WEARS GLASSES; ...
BLACK; COLOR OF EYES: BROWN; TEETH: ...
THIN; POSTURE: ERECT.
LANGUAGES: NATIVE PERSIAN, GOOD ENGLISH ...

2. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 04 OCT 99 TRV ...

S E C R E T
#0536



S E C R E T 0508[illegible]

CITE TEHRAN 54412

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR I[illegible]

VNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA PLSDURN FJ[illegible]

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 526966
B. DIRECTOR 526974

1. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION IS CORRECT, [illegible] AS DARK BROWN RATHER THAN BLACK. GLASSES [illegible] FORCE" TYPE.

2. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 050CT99 DRV D9C.1.
E C R E T



050CT79 0547Z

S E C R E T 052125Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 54895

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO IMMEDIATE FRANTECH, DIRECTOR.

RYBAT LFGAMIN AJAJA PLSDURN FJPASTINE TECHS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 526966
B. TEHRAN 54412

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED SINCE THERE IS POSSIBILITY ALIAS DOCUMENTS MAY BE REQUIRED FOR EXFILTRATION OF SDURN/1.

2. REVIEW OF DTS PASSPORT ISSUANCE CAPABILITIES IN SEARCH OF NATIONALITY THAT WOULD BE PLAUSIBLE FOR SDURN/1, CONCERNING RACIAL FEATURES, LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE, VISA REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTERING IRAN AND FOR ONWARD TRAVEL, MAKES PORTUGUESE PASSPORT ISSUED IN MACAO SEEM MOST DESIRABLE. ALL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES' PPTS REQUIRE IRANIAN VISA, EXCEPT ONE COUNTRIES' PPTS AVAILABLE WOULD REQUIRE VISA, NOT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE SUBJECT DOES NOT SPEAK FRENCH. KUWAIT PPT CONSIDERED, BUT VISA REQUIREMENT AND POSSIBLE ONWARD TRAVEL FROM IRAN TO KUWAIT MAY MAKE THIS POOR CHOICE

3. PROPOSE COVER LEGEND OF PORTUGUESE BUSINESSMAN RESIDING IN MACAO WHO HAS MADE PREVIOUS TRIPS TO HONG KONG AND WESTERN EUROPE. TRAVEL WOULD SHOW IN PPT. SUBJECT IS NOW ON RETURN LEG OF ROUND-TRIP FRANKFURT-MACAO-FRANKFURT, WHEN HE LANDS IN TEHRAN, AT WHICH POINT ACTUAL USE OF ALIAS PPT BEGINS. THIS ITINERARY WOULD PERMIT USE OF AIRLINE TICKET WHICH MAY BE TOPENC.

4. HAVE CAPABILITY TO ISSUE FOLLOWING SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS:
A. SMALLPOX AND CHOLERA VACCINATION CERTIFICATES FROM HONG KONG; SHOULD HAVE BEEN
B. MACAO RESIDENT'S ID CARD, WHICH OSTENSIBLY COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED A FEW YEARS BACK, DEPENDING ON AVAILABILITY OF OLD PHOTOS OF SUBJECT.

5. ITEMS NEEDED FROM TEHRAN FOR DOCUMENT ISSUANCE ARE:

PAGE 2 DIRTECH 54895 S E C R E T

A. OLD AND RECENT PHOTOS OF SUBJECT, AS AVAILABLE. NEGATIVES ARE PREFERRED. HQS CAN MAKE FIRST GENERATION PRINT OF SUBJECT'S PHOTO IN LINYUMA FILES.

B. ALIAS WITH TWO GIVEN NAMES AND TWO FAMILY NAMES CAN BE PROVIDED BY OTS AND CABLED TO TEHRAN FOR USE IN OBTAINING SIX SIGNATURE SPECIMENS OF SAME MADE PERSONALLY BY SUBJECT.

6. REQUEST STATION'S VIEWS RE SUITABILITY OF PORTUGUESE PPT ISSUED IN MACAO. IF ALIAS DOCUMENTATION IS USED, ADVISE WHETHER STATION BELIEVES ALSO DISGUISE WILL BE USED.

7. FRANTECH: COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS INVITED. OTS RECORDS DO NOT REFLECT EZNOVA PORTUGUESE PPT ISSUANCE CAPABILITY. WILL FORWARD IF NEEDED. PLS ADVISE.

8. ABOVE PROPOSAL INTENDED MERELY AS INITIAL THINKING ON EXFILTR IF IT ARISES.

9. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 050C 99 DRV C9C1.1A BY 063803.

S E C R E T

7 OCT 79 03 43Z

S E C R E T 061044Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE FRANTECH 39945

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRTECH INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT TECHS AJAJA PLSDURN FJPASTIME

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 526966
B. DIRTECH 57895
C. FRANTECH 39926 (NOTAL)

1. REF B SCENARIO FOR POSSIBLE SDURN EXFILTRATION FROM IRAN WITH PORTUGUESE DOCUMENTATION WORTH CONSIDERATION. WE FEEL HOWEVER, THAT REQUIREMENT FOR ENTRY VISA IN ITSELF SHOULD NOT ELIMINATE CONSIDERATION OF LATIN AMERICAN OR OTHER NATIONALITY PASSPORT REQUIRING VISA. OUR LATEST INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO IRAN IS IN THIS VISA-REQUIRED STATUS (RUTHERFORD REPORTED THAT HE RECEIVED ENTRY VISA IN ATHENS WITHOUT DELAY OR PROBLEM). OUR INFORMATION ON TRAVEL TO IRAN IN NON-VISA STATUS IS INCOMPLETE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES ON BOTTOM OF DEBARKATION CARD REQUIRED FOR DEPARTURE. EXFILTRATION IN THIS STATUS WOULD REQUIRE COLLECTION EFFORT TO FILL IN THIS GAP.

2. WE FEEL THAT IF IRAN ENTRY VISAS ARE NOW MORE READILY AVAILABLE THAN IN PAST, IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE VISA LEGITIMATELY PLACED IN SUBJECT'S PASSPORT; IF NOT, EXEMPLARS FOR REPRODUCTION WOULD BE AVAILABLE. USE OF LATIN AMERICAN OR OTHER NATIONALITY PASSPORT REQUIRING ENTRY VISA SHOULD BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED. WE DO NOT HAVE BLANK PORTUGUESE

3. RUTHERFORD REPORTED THAT ON ARRIVAL IN IRAN, HE WAS QUESTIONED SEVERAL TIMES AT DIFFERENT POINTS DURING THE PASSPORT CONTROL/CUSTOMS EXAMINATION PROCEDURE ON HIS REASONS FOR TRAVEL TO IRAN AND HIS INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY. HE NOTICED NO EXTRAORDINARY CONTROL MEASURES ON DEPARTURE.

4. FOR TEHRAN: WE REALIZE THAT DOCUMENTATION EXFILTRATION IS ONLY POSSIBILITY AT THIS POINT; HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT EFFORTS BE MADE TO EXAMINE PASSPORTS/DEBARKATION CARDS OF RECENT VISITORS IN BOTH VISA AND NON-VISA CATEGORIES.

5. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 6 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T
BT
#9945



S E C R E T 2815152 OCT 79 STATE

CITE DIRTECH 54980

TO: PRIORITY FRANTECH INFO TEHRAN, HECTOR.

BY BAT LPG AMIN AJAJA RLSDURN FJPASTIMTECHS

REFS: A. DIRTECH 54805
B. FRANTECH 39945

1. OTS IS POUCHING TO EZNOVA VIA [illegible] 4791 [illegible] FOLLOWING ITEMS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN [illegible] SUBJ [illegible] A. SET OF FOUR NEGATIVES MADE [illegible] ID PHO [illegible] WIFE, SON AND DAUGHTER. CONTACT PRI [illegible] FROM NE [illegible] ORIGINAL PHOTOS WERE BORROWED FROM L [illegible] FILES [illegible] RETURNED. THESE PHOTOS WERE TAKEN S [illegible] PRESENT PLANNING IS FOR SUBJECTS FAM [illegible] IF POSSIBLE. MAI HAVE TO PROVIDE AS [illegible] B. COPIES OF EXEMPLARS OF MACA [illegible]

2. OTS IS ASSEMBLING ISSUANCE KI [illegible] AND MACAO ID, WHICH WILL BE POUCHED [illegible]

3. OTS PREFERS USE OF PORTUGUESE [illegible] ALIAS DOCUMENTATION. CONSIDER BRAZI [illegible] OPTION BECAUSE IT IS THE ONLY ONE IN [illegible] DOCUMENTATION MAY BE GREATER RISK FO [illegible] GREATER LIKELIHOOD OF CHALLENGE BY I [illegible] THAN PORTUGUESE.

4. WISH EMPHASIZE TO TEHRAN THAT [illegible] WILL PRODUCE SECOND GENERATION PHOTO [illegible] PHOTOS. ABOVE NEGATIVES BEING PROVI [illegible] TO OBTAIN BETTER NEGATIVES/PRINTS OR [illegible]

5. ABOVE COMMENTS AND ITEMS BEIN [illegible] IN CASE ALIAS TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION P [illegible]

6. FILE: 201-949163. RWW 11OCT [illegible]
S E C R E T
BT
#4980



30Oct79 25Z

S E C R E T 4815Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 311220. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRAN

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/INTEL, DPDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: INTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.
1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER NIT'S 10,718 THROUGH 10,720 REVIEWED 10 OCTOBER 1979.

OBJECTIVE: S.1.2. RATING: 5
FIELD NO: NIR-10,716 OPACI SOURCE
DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15860-79, 6 SEPT 1979
UNILATERAL; SOURCE/SDURN/1/ FULL CONTROLS
SUBJECT: 1. STRUCTURE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL;
2. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG IRANIAN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT FIGURES.
COMMENT: THERE IS ALSO CONTINUING INTEREST IN IDENTIFYING SIGNIFICANT FIGURES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THOSE POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITIES. HEAD CONTINUES TO WANT REPORTING ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, ITS MEMBERS, AND ITS ROLE IN THE REGIME.



22 Oct 79 14 51 Z

SECRET 221414Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRTECH 55156

TO: PRIORITY FRANTECH INFO TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.

WINTEL RYBAT LRGAMIN AJAJA PLSDURN PJPASTIME TECHS

REFS: A. DIRTECH 54895
B. DIRTECH 54980
C. DIRTECH 55004

1. ITEMS LISTED BELOW BEING POUCHED VIA IN NLR 516964, AS PROMISED IN REFS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN DOCUMENTING SDURN/1:

A. NOTIONAL DRY SEAL FOR BEARER'S PHOTO IN PORTUGUESE PPT ISSUED IN MACAO. FICHES SHOWING MACAO-ISSUED PPT DISPLAY NO VIS EVIDENCE OF SEAL. HOWEVER, PORTUGUESE PPTS ISSUED ELSEWHERE APPEAR TO HAVE SEAL OR CACHET. ALSO PHRASES "CACHET/DRY SEAL" IS PRINTED IN PORTUGUESE BETWEEN TWO PHOTO BLOCKS IN PORTUGUESE PPT NOTIONAL SEAL BASED ON CACHET OF PORTUGUESE CONSULATE GENERAL, PARIS, 1975.

B. NEGATIVES AND COLOR ANNOTATED XEROX COPIES OF TWO PPT PAGE SPREADS SHOWING 1979 MACAO AND HONG KONG CACHETS.

2. PPT FROM WHICH ITEM B COPIES WERE MADE WAS PHOTOGRAPHED OUTINERLY FOR INCLUSION IN ITD SYSTEM.

3. FILE: 201-949163. RVW 150CT99 DRV CWCI.14 BY C63803.

SECRET

SDURN/1. MR. BAHRAMIAN. SELF-EMPLOYED CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR. MARRIED, WITH AT LEAST ONE CHILD, A SON AGED ABOUT 12. U/I AGED ABOUT 40.

U/I, AS OF AUGUST 79, WAS A MEMBER OF AN INFORMAL GROUP ADVISING AND CONSULTING WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. (IT IS RECALLED THAT HE MENTIONED TWO OR PERHAPS THREE NAMES OF OTHER MEMBERS; IT IS BELIEVED THAT ENTEZAM AND A MR. SAHABI WERE AMONG THEM.) IN THIS CAPACITY, HE REPORTED ON THE PLANS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT.

BETWEEN LATE JUNE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE EMBASSY, THERE WERE THREE OR FOUR MEETINGS WITH U/I, ALL OF THEM IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. HIS INFORMATION REPORTING DURING THAT PERIOD CONCERNED A RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN PROPOSING THE MOBILIZATION OF UNEMPLOYED TECHNICIANS AND THE ~~ARMY~~ RESOURCES OF MINISTRIES SUCH AS ROADS AND HEALTH. (U/I WAS UNABLE TO RESPOND TO STATION QUERIES ABOUT SUCH MATTERS AS THE SUBSTANCE OF BAZARGAN'S MEETINGS WITH THE IMAM.)

IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER, AFTER U/I HAD MISSED TWO PRE-ARRANGED MEETINGS, SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS WERE MADE TO CONTACT HIM BY PHONE. HE WAS FINALLY REACHED AT HOME. HE SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT HIS SAFETY, AS A 'GUARD' (PERHAPS A SURVEILLANT) HAD RECENTLY APPEARED OUTSIDE HIS HOME. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT ORGANIZATION THIS GUARD BELONGED, BUT THAT IN VIEW OF MR NAZIH'S DIFFICULTIES, HE WAS AFRAID HE MIGHT BE ARRESTED. U/I SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO TERMINATE HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, CLOSE HIS BUSINESS, AND LEAVE THE COUNTRY. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO LEAVE IRAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER A TRIP TO BALUCHISTAN (AS RECALLED) TO CONCLUDE SOME BUSINESS THERE. HE WAS ASKED TO MAKE PHONE CONTACT UPON HIS RETURN. HE DID NOT DO SO, AND THERE WAS NO SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION WITH HIM.

THE STATION REPORTED THIS DEVELOPMENT, AND HQS INSTRUCTED WOLOCK, EZNOVA, AND EZVIVD TO BEGIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN CASE U/I NEEDED HELP TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. DETAILS OF SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ARE NOT RECALLED, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT MACAO AND LEBANESE PASSPORTS WERE BEING CONSIDERED. AS THERE WAS NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH, NO ASSISTANCE WAS EVER ASKED OR OFFERED.

Real Name: Khusrow Qashqai.

Code Name: S. D. Rater/4.

In this section the documents concerned with Qashqai are contained, a part of which is related to the documents of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and another part is concerned with the documents of the C. I. A. (those belonging to the period between 1330-1343 Shamsi-Hijri (1951-1964) are related with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the rest are related with the C. I. A.).

A little attention to the dates and the contents of the documents related with the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Qashqai's meetings with the officials of the embassy (during 1952) is sufficient to reveal the extent of his association with the U. S. administration and the nature of his activities. In spite of his anti-Shah tendencies he was favourably inclined towards America and the West, and in this regard he never hesitated to express his urge to help them.

The C. I. A. documents concerned with Khusrow Qashqai are mostly composed of his reports, his meetings with the C. I. A. officials and his

stand vis-a-vis the then current course of events in Iran. There is nothing available regarding his past record with the C. I. A.

Though he did not receive any salary from the C. I. A., his cooperation with America may have been on account of his intention to gain support from America in fulfilling his future ambitions concerning the Islamic Republic.

The principal reports and opinions of Khusrow Qashqai revolve around certain specific aims:

-By weakening the provisional government and secretly opposing the Islamic Republic, while outwardly, supporting it, he was planning to incite different political and military leaders into starting a series of operations to overthrow the government. In this connection he made contacts with Madani and asked him to supervise a military coup against the Imam and the Bazargan government. According to his own claims, Qashqai contemplated certain preventive, and strategic measures necessary for opposing the government and launching an armed struggle against the Islamic Republic. Contacts were also made with him from the side of Bakhtiyar and he was even offered payment for organizing a coup. During one of his meetings he speaks about his contacts with the Arab dissidents and that they will act as the suppliers of arms to the non-Arab tribes of the south every now and then.

- Qashqai was planning to bring out a publication in association with Madani, and he had informed the C. I. A. about this plan. The C. I. A., too, was thinking about the possibilities of bringing out a publication which would serve as their organ against the anti-American atmosphere prevailing in Iran and would counter the attacks against America. The C. I. A. was secretly planning to not only encourage Khusrow Qashqai in this regard but also to give him the material aid that he was asking for to aid in the printing and distribution of this publication. They advised him to take steps to select the material desired to be published.

Through these meetings and visits the C. I. A. wanted to attain the following aims:

- Obtain information about the Qashqai tribe and the possibilities of this tribe in confronting the Islamic Republic and the chances of exploiting it in emergency conditions, since they believed that the Qashqais were the only tribe besides the Kurds, who were in a position to put up active resistence.

- Obtain information about the security conditions in Khuzistan and Fars Provinces.

- To reach a political understanding with Madani, because Qashqai had a close relationship with him.

- To watch Qashqai in his anti-government activities. The appoin-

tment of Qashqai was ment for fulfilling different purposes such as influencing the National Front for promoting the pro-America moderate forces and supplying them with information and reports; arranging meetings with the Interior Minister Haj Sayed Jawwadi with the view of getting information about the future programmes of the provisional government concerning the elections; arranging meetings with Shariat Madari and Khaqani in order to establish a possible future programme; and meeting with bringadier general Jam with the hope of fulfiling, a certain function in a specified period of time. On the whole, the aim of using Qashqai as an intermediary and a catalyst agent was bringing together all the pro-American moderate forces throughout the various classes of society. (The document about this part can be seen with the documents concerning Shariat Madari).

CONFIDENTIAL

Khosro QASHQAI was a Deputy to the 16th and 17th Majlises and a close advisor to Mossadeq on tribal affairs. He, along with several of his brothers, is in official exile from Iran and now lives in Geneva, although he is in the US at the moment. He is extremely active and vocal in opposition to the Shah's government, but is probably out of contact with most of the groups within Iran except through his brother Mohammad Hosein, who is permitted to live in Tehran. He is reportedly addicted to drugs.

---Le gouvernement a décidé de saisir les biens de certains chefs de tribus du sud qui sont hostiles envers le fisc. Le celebre parc Eram, à Chiraz, propriété de Khosrow Kachkai a déjà été saisi. (Setaréh Salam du 4) 7.6.57

KHOSROW QASHQA'I'S LETTER TO MOSSADEQ: Khosrow Qashqa'i, now in Europe, has written a letter to Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, the former Prime Minister. He expresses his unhappiness in this letter about the state of the National Front. In his reply, Dr. Mossadeq wrote that he too is dissatisfied with the leaders of the National Front. Khosrow Qashqa'i has released both letters to the European press. (Diplomat 12/19/62

CONFIDENTIAL Tehran 186 Enclosure 1

Encl #7

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

QASH.AI, Khosro

Personal data:	Born 1921, Firuzabad; youngest son of Soulat-ed-Doleh; unmarried.
Education:	Alborz College, Tehran.
Languages:	Turkish, Persian, English.
Career:	
1941	Assumed duties as one of four brothers responsible to their mother for conduct of Qashqai tribal affairs.
Nov. 1942	Conference at Shiraz with British Consul re general tribal policy.
July 1944	Supplied with arms and ammunition by government; pursued and subdued his fugitive cousin Ghenghis Khan.
1947-49	Deputy from Firuzabad to 15th Majlis.
Nov. 1947	Traveled in Switzerland and America.
April 1948	Returned to Iran.
1950	Deputy from Firuzabad to 16th Majlis; member of Agricultural Commission of Majlis.

Remarks:

Shortly after leaving the American College of Tehran in 1939, Khosro Khan assumed his tribal duties and since that time has spent most of his time in the provinces as compared with his brothers who spent most of their time in Tehran. Until his election to the 15th Majlis, he paid only periodic visits to Tehran and was the least publicized of the four brothers. In 1943 he was appointed Governor of Firuzabad, his duties consisting for the most part of keeping belligerent sub-tribal leaders in line and conferring from time to time with high-ranking officers of the Iranian Army. At that time the Qashqais were not in favor with the Central Government because of their previous pro-German sympathies and their refusal to disarm their tribesmen.

In August of 1944 Khosro was supplied with Government arms and ammunition and, with fifty followers, pursued and subdued his fugitive cousin Ghenghis Khan.

CONFIDENTIAL

In February, 1942, Khosro was involved in the "Semirum" incident. The Qashqai tribe led by him attacked the Semirum garrison, killing about 100 soldiers and executing the Commanding Officer. In 1946 during the Fars National Movement he participated in the fighting against the Government.

In October, 1947, after a series of disputes over disarming the tribesmen, he was granted a visa to the U.S. and Switzerland. Local comment concerning the trip attributed it to an effort on the part of the Qashqais to sooth the Shah's feelings..

In the present Majlis, Khosro is one of the four secretaries of the Majlis.

He is of medium height, stocky, an athlete, with heavy Turkish features, heavy black hair and a pleasant smile.

Precocious, consistently pro-American, anti-Russian and distrustful of the British.

SECRET
Security Information

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Office of the Army Attache

Tehran, Iran
26 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Cuomo, American Embassy

Khosrow's remarks include the following:

Prince Ali Reza was in the disturbances Monday and personally shot and killed two Iranians.

The Committee of Inquiry will determine who was responsible for the civilian killings Monday and they will all hang.

I hate the Shah.

All of Army G-2 are guilty and will come before the Committee.

Use of the Army against Iranians is unconstitutional.

I just paid General Garzan 10,000 tomans last week (rest of sentence undistinguishable).

I am pro-American.

JOHN I. HINCKE
Colonel, GS
Army Attache

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM RESTRICTED

July 24, 1952

TO: Mr. Cuomo

FROM: Mr. Norden

SUB: Conversation with Khosro Quashquai

Last night at Mr. Melbourne's cocktail party I joined a conversation between Col. Hincke and Khosro Quahsquai, which may be of interest to you.

Quashquai was holding forth about popular feelings againstthe Shah, and maintained that we would not find a single picture of the Shah in a public place today as the crowds will have ripped them all down. He added that he himself had a score to settle with the Shah because the Shah's father had killed his father, but added that the Shah was still useful. An argument also developed as to whether the Shah was Commander-in-Chief of the Army: Quashquai had maintained that American Military Aid was given to the Shah and not to Iran.

Some of Quashquai's assertions were so close to the Tudeh line that I felt constrained to ask him if he was a member of the National Front, which he said he was. No doubt Col. Hincke can give you further details, as the discussion was well advanced when I joined it.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

October 4, 1952

QASHQAI, Khosro Khan

Supplementing Embassy's undated CBD.

Career:

1950 - February 1952: Deputy to 16th Majlis from Firuzabad. Vice-President of Majlis.

April 27, 1952: Deputy to 17th Majlis from Firuzabad.

Remarks:

Qashqai's election went unchallenged, based as it was on the votes of his tribesmen. While critical of some of Dr. Mosadeq's policies, furthermore, he has consistently and openly supported the government and is one of the National Front's most valuable assets.

Recently Qashqai delivered a bitter speech in the Majlis, attacking Americans for their alleged "sabotage" of the Mosadeq government during the brief premiership of Qavam. His friendship for various members of the American Embassy has, however, continued, and he has explained his outburst as an attempt to open American eyes to their mistake in failing to support the National Front government strenuously. He has further explained his objection to the U.S. military missions by insisting that the resulting equipment and trained men will be used against the interests of Iran. He appears to have chosen to stick with Mosadeq in the ever-widening split between Kashani and the Prime Minister, but his tendancy toward intrigue on a master scale makes any such conclusion tenuous at best.

MRParrish/mrp

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Tehran, Iran, October 28, 1954.

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Buckingham:

I am enclosing an office memorandum to you on a visit of Khosro Khan to Shiraz while I was there. I thought it might be of interest to you. I am giving Mr. Koren a carbon copy also.

My visit to Fars was most enjoyable. I flew to Shiraz on Saturday morning. I went out to Persepolis Sunday and on Monday and Tuesday remained in Shiraz. I returned to Tehran by air on Tuesday afternoon.

I hope you and Mrs. Buckingham had an interesting trip. Mr. Gilfillen mentioned that he hoped you would visit Shiraz again.

I enjoyed meeting you and hope to have the pleasure of being with you and Mrs. Buckingham again.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Funseth
American Vice Consul

Enclosure:
Office Memo

Bryant Buckingham, Esquire,
American Consul,
Isfahan.

CONFIDENTIAL

Bryant Buckingham, American Consul, Isfahan October 28, 1954

Robert L. Funseth, American Vice Consul, Tabriz

Khosro KHAN, Recent Visit to Shiraz

While discussing informally and unofficially the general subject of the tribes with Mr. BAHMANBEGUI, Chief of Tribal Education Program of Point Four in Shiraz, I learned that Khosro KHAN had visited General AZIZI on Sunday, October 24. According to Bahmanbegui, Khosro Khan is presently living at Firuzabad.

Subsequently Mr. Donald Gilfillen, Provincial Director of Point Four in Shiraz told me that General Azizi was calling on him that afternoon (October 25). I suggested to Mr. Gilfillen that he casually mention the Khosro visit to the General. The following information was related to me by Mr. Gilfillen after his talk with General Azizi.

According to General Azizi a messenger from Khosro Khan called on him Sunday advising that Khosro was outside of the city and would like safe passage in order to talk with the General. The General said he promptly sent an escort and had Khosro Khan brought to his office. The General told Mr. Gilfillen that Khosro appeared very nervous. Azizi said he told Khosro he had no reason to feel insecure. Further that Khosro could travel freely anywhere without fear. However, the General said he told him that the Government still insisted that Khosro leave before a certain date or be subject to arrest. He said he told Khosro the Government in general and his command in Fars in particular were desirous of good relations with the tribes. The General said he told him there was to be no trouble with the tribes. However he said he told Khosro because of his activities last year in stirring up trouble it was absolutely mandatory that he leave. The General implied, according to Mr. Gilfillen, that if Khosro didn't get out upon this date (the General did not mention the date) the Army would come and get him out.

This ends information I received concerning the Gilfillen-Azizi conversation. In my earlier conversation, Bahmanbegui said that he believed Khosro Khan no longer had much support amongst the tribes. According to Bahmanbegui the support Khosro still enjoys is based solely on his wealth.

Background on Bahmanbegui: About 40 years old. Is a member of the Amaleh tribe. His father is in the mountains with his sub-tribe. Bahmanbegui is a graduate of the University of Tehran law school. He directs the Point Four tribal education program which appears to be an excellent operation. He seems sincerely interested in his work.

CONFIDENTIAL

He visited the United States in 1952 for six months on a private visit. This trip was mostly financed by Khosro Khan. He speaks good English. He told me that because he opposed Khosro in his abortive act of last year he has lost favor with him. He implied that he was active in forming an opposition to the Khan's acts.

cc: Mr. Koren
AmConsulate, Tabriz

July 1952

Mr Guomo

Last night at Mr. Melbournes I joined Khosro Quashqai and Commander Pollard for a few moments. Quashqai was saying that the US had supplied the arms that killed innocent people and was therefore guilty of their murder. Pollard pointed out that all Military aid had been turned over to the Iranian Government. Quashqai replied that there had been no real Iranian Government for forty years but an Intelligence Service Govt. A Govt of Major Jackson, Dr. Zenner and Middleton. The point was wld the US now aid the real Iranian Govt. The arms had been given to the Shah in the past. At this point he said "I have a score to settle with the Shah and one day I will settle it". He said what Iran needs is a democratic Shah. At this point I left the group.

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Carded 1-15-68

29 DEC 1967

"This document consists of 1 pages.
Copy 1 of 1 received. Series SY-A"

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Khosrow Khan QASHQAI

1. A reliable and sensitive source has reported that Khosrow Khan QASHQAI has received an invitation to visit the United States from his nephew, Amir Abdollah QASHQAI, a doctor residing at No. 1 Main Street, Chisholm, Maine.

2. Khosrow Khan QASHQAI, an Iranian citizen was born circa 1920 in Shiraz, Iran. He is one of the exiled leaders of the Qashqai tribe in Iran. The Qashqai leaders were forced to flee Iran about 1954 due to their continued opposition which at times led to armed revolt against the present regime of Iran. Subject presently resides in Munich, Germany where he maintains contact with all of the anti-regime elements residing abroad.

3. Should Subject accept his nephew's invitation to visit the United States, this Agency would appreciate having Subject's activities monitored and kept informed of his contacts.

4. In order to protect our source you are requested not to reveal the source of the above information in any conversations you may have with Subject.

CSCI-316/05542-67

cc: Immigration & Naturalization Service
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 8 19[illegible]

Intelligence Liaison Section

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 3 1968
OFFICE OF SECURITY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

QASHQAI, Khosrow Khan

PROTECTIVE SECURITY 1968 JAN 4 PM 54

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

EMBASSY

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: Iran
2. SUBJECT: (C) Insurrection - Plan of Khosro Khan Qashqai
3. ISC NUMBER:
6. REPORT NUMBER: 2846045763
9. DATE OF REPORT: 19 June 1963
10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
11. REFERENCES: DIRN 1446
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 6 Jun 63
12. ORIGINATOR: OSBARMA, Iran
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Tehran, 15 Jun 63
13. PREPARED BY: Col. C.M. POSTON
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: U.S. Army Attache
7. SOURCE: Highly Competent U.S. Observer

UNITED STATES OF THE [illegible] OF AMERICA
21 JUN 1963
1 COPY RECD
TEHRAN

15. SUMMARY: (Leave Blank)

Report contains information on the current status and projected plans of Khosro Khan Qashqai.

1. Khosro Khan Qashqai and his mother plan to leave Germany in the near future as his passport has been withdrawn. He would not disclose his ultimate destination, but the source estimates he will try to "infiltrate" into Iran.

2. Mohammad Hossein was in Munich about 1 June. He returned to Switzerland and will return to Germany in the near future.

3. Student demonstrations are scheduled to take place in Europe in the near future. They will include attacks on the Iranian embassies.

4. Khosro Khan claims to have collected $25,000 dollars from Iranian

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
Embassy, Tehran
OR, Tehran

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; UNCLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS, DOD DIR 5200.10

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
SECRET
(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1 SEP 65 1396
REPLACES DA FORM 1046, 1 AUG 59, OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 111, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 65.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION (Classification and Control Markings)	REPORT NO. 2846045763 PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES ORIGINATOR OSAARMA, Iran

(Leave Blank)

students in Europe. He intends to use the money for the purchase of arms. He is interested in obtaining .45 caliber grease guns (M-3 SMG), BARs, 3.5 inch rocket launchers and plastic explosives. These he hopes to be able to get into Iran in order to conduct terrorist attacks on lines of communication.

5. He estimates that the next groups of tribes to join in resistance against the government are the Bakhtiari with the Kurds, with the exception of the Javanrudi following.

6. If he can obtain the necessary propaganda means, radios, loud-speakers, and broadcasting equipment, he intends to carry out a propaganda campaign against the government concurrently with his raids on communication lines.

7. His information is that the tribes to date have taken 2,500 rifles from the IIA and IIG in Fars.

8. He states that the British 10-shot rifle which is reportedly in Fars is a British WWII type rifle.

9. M-1 ammunition is now 5 Tomans (aprx .66¢) per round in Fars.

10. Khosro Khan claims he is in close contact with Teimur Bakhtiar and they hope to use the latters influence among the IIA officers in order to undermine the present regime.

COMMENT: The source describes Khosrow Khan to be motivated by only one objective; i.e. the overthrow of HIM. Source states that as a means to this end, Khosrow Khan has become and avid student of guerilla operations. Source, who recently visited with many Qashqais, believes Khosrow Khan has more acceptance with the Qahqaai's than is generally accepted. Source, believes that Khosrow Khan has relative good information on the events which occur in Iran. While the estimates of the number of arms seized from the IIA and IIG may be high, they are not beyond the realm of possibility. Reliable foreign military sources estimate loss of arms by the IIA may be at least this high, they state losses include 3-4 4.2 mortars and at least two truckloads of .30 caliber machine guns (estimated 30 to 40). In addition, the tribes through deceptive camp layouts have been the recipients of one complete drop of food and ammunition.

COMMENT: (Of Preparing Officer) Even in Europe with discounts, $25,000 will not go far in purchasing automatic weapons, bazookas and communication equipment. About all Khosrow Khan could obtain would be enough material to fool some of the people some of the time as to his degree of outside backing.

FIELD COORDINATION: CAS, State/PoL

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

SECRET

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60 AND DA FORM 606, 1 AUG 60 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

QASHQAI, Khosrow CONFIDENTIAL

FF

Residing in Germany.

Foreign Ministry requested he not be granted a visa for US during Shah's visit. Past record of making trouble during visits of Shah.

Tehran Telegram 1114
June 3, 1964

FORM FS-436
4-23-57

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: QASHQAI POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND MILITARY CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS (DOI: EARLY JULY 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. ALTHOUGH KHOSROW QASHQAI STILL SUPPORTS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER MEHDI B A Z A R G A N, HE SEES ITS AUTHORITY AS LIMITED AND STILL DECLINING, AND BELIEVES THAT WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS WIDESPREAD AND VIOLENT CIVIL DISORDER IS LIKELY TO RESUME. HE IS THEREFORE PROCEEDING TO CONSOLIDATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY LLEADERS IN SOUTHER IRAN AND IN TEHRAN IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE QASHQAI PEOPLE AND THEIR ALLIES FROM THE EFFECTS OF FURTHER EVAPORATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHO ITY. QASHQAI ESTIMATES THAT HE IS SUPPORTED BY NINETY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IN AREAS WHERE THE QASHQAI PEOPLE ARE NUMEROUS, AND THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT ALSO IN ADJACENT PORTIONS OF SOUTHWEST IRAN. HE BELIEVES THAT HIS SUPPORTERS NOW NUMBER SOME FIVE MILLION. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE IS IN FULL SYMPATHY WITH KHOSROW QASHQAI'S OBJECTIVES, AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO CORRECT ANY EXAGGERATION IN THE LATTER'S ESTIMATES OF QASHQAI NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE.)

2. E. THE QASHQAI'S ARE DEVELOPING CONTACTS WITH MILITARY COMMANDERS, BOTH LOCALLY AND IN TEHRAN. THERE ARE CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE COMMANDERS OF ARMORED AND INFANTRY UNITS IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN, AND THERE IS CONTACT ALSO IN TEHRAN WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL ALI F A L L A H I, COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN GROUND FORCES. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE DID NOT REVEAL THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE CONTACTS.) ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO DEVELOP SIMILAR CONTACTS IN THE AIR FORCE, BUT THESE HAVE NOT BEEN FRUITFUL, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE DISRUPTION OF AIR FORCE ACTIVITY AND ORGANIZATION BY THE TECHNICIANS KNOWN AS HOUSEFARS.

3. QASHQAI TRIBESMEN ARE ACQUIRING NEW WEAPONS. THE LATEST INCREMENT IS A SHIPMENT OF 400 KALASHNIKOV RIFLES. MOST QASHQAI ARMS ARE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, BUT THERE ARE SOME MACHINE GUNS AND A FEW MORTARS.

4. [redacted] ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (9 JULY 1979). FIELD REPORT NO. NI [redacted]65 [redacted].

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN. [redacted]NT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI, [redacted]WAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

[redacted]PORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND [redacted]THODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RE-[redacted]ASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION [redacted]D EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

[redacted]W IS JUL [redacted]9 DRV 29C.1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING [redacted]FICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF [redacted]ERALL DOCUMENT.



PORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

INTRY: IRAN

JECT: VIEWS OF QASHQAI LEADER ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

RCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A
SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY
HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. IN EARLY JULY 1979, QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW
S H O A I GAVE CLOSE ASSOCIATES THE FOLLOWING INTERPRETATION
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN.

A. AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I IS THE MOST INTEL-
GENT AND LEAST REACTIONARY OF THE IMPORTANT MULLAHS, BUT HIS
LIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM INHIBITS HIM FROM DELEGATING REAL POWER
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI). EVEN IF HE WERE DIS-
SED TO DO SO, THE REST OF THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT WOULD
VENT IT. THE MULLAHS GENERALLY ARE IGNORANT, PROVINCIAL, MUTUALLY
SPICIOUS, AND JEALOUS OF THEIR OWN PERSONAL FOLLOWINGS. KHOMEINI
ILL ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF PERHAPS 70 PERCENT OF IRANIANS, BUT THIS
PPORT IS ERODING AT A RATE WHICH COULD CUT IT IN HALF IN THE NEXT
REE MONTHS. (FIELD COMMENT: ASKED WHETHER QASHQAI CONSIDERS
LLAHS SUCH AS HAMEZ S H A R I A T M A D A R I TO BE MORE
NDAMENTALIST THAN KHOMEINI, SOURCE SAID THAT QASHQAI REGARDS
A SHARIATMADARI AS A POLITICIAN, NOT A RELIGIOUS FIGURE.)

B. THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT'S WEAKNESS DERIVES ONLY PARTLY
OM ITS DEPENDENCE ON KHOMEINI. TWO OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS ARE
E GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF POLITICAL EXPERTISE AND ITS INTERNAL
ICTIONS, THE RESULT OF WHICH IS THAT THE PGOI DOES NOT EXERCISE
E POWER IT ALREADY HAS. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI DID NOT
SCRIBE THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS OR IDENTIFY AREAS IN WHICH THE
VERNMENT IS MISSING OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE ITS AUTHORITY FELT.)

C. TWO FACTORS ARE LIKELY TO COMBINE TO PRODUCE RENEWED
SSIVE CIVIL DISORDER. ONE IS THE GROWING TENSION AMONG POLITICAL
OUPS, EACH OF WHICH, MORE OR LESS REGARDLESS OF IDEOLOGY, AIMS



COUIRING A MONOPOLY OF POWER. SECOND IS THE PROSPECT OF
RE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO SUSPEND
FUNDING OF PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WHILE IT LOOKS FOR EVIDENCE
PAST FINANCIAL ABUSES, WITH A RESULTING INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT
S IS COMPOUNDED BY THE DISTORTION OF THE RURAL ECONOMY. WHERE IT
BECOME COMMONPLACE TO SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, IMPORTED FROZEN
CKENS SOLD IN VILLAGES. THESE IMPORTS ARE NOW SUSPENDED, AND
RURAL ECONOMY IS PREPARED NEITHER TO SUPPLY THE CITIES NOR
F ALL ITS OWN NEEDS.

2. ACQ IRAN, TEHRAN (9 JULY 1979) FIELD REPORT NO: MIT-
659.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN.
T TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL, KARACHI,
NIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.
ORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
HODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RE-
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EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
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PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.



10 Jul 79 1 1 53 Z

S E C R E T 101953Z JUL 79 INTEL

CITE TEHRAN 53648

TO: DIRECTOR FYI AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KABUL
KARACHI, KUWAIT, NEW DELHI, TELAVIV.

WINTEL SDROTTER

SUBDATA: SDROTTER/4 ON 9 JULY. NO LIAISON. NO INDEX. PAQUIN
OBTAINED. DIR SEE TEHRAN 53648 NOT AFFECTING DISSEM.
INTEL NO. NIT-10,659. CL BY 015356. NO FILE.

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

Aug 79 02 55 Z

S E C R E T 021952Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 486833.

TO: TEHRAN.

WINTEL SDROTTER PSICH

1. IT HAS NOW BEEN SIX MONTHS SINCE THE PRESENT REGIME
ASSUMED POWER IN IRAN. IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT IF THE IRANIANS
WERE LEFT MORE OR LESS ALONE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME A STABLE,
MODERATE, AND RELATIVELY PRO-UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MIGHT
EVOLVE. SUCH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE, AND WE ARE FACED WITH CON-
TINUING INSTABILITY IN IRAN, GROWING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT NEXT
DOOR IN AFGHANISTAN, AND A WORLD ENERGY CRISIS. BASED ON THIS
SITUATION WE WISH TO HAVE COVERT ACTION MECHANISMS
IN PLACE TO SUPPLEMENT OVERT POLICY IF WE ARE CALLED UPON TO DO
SO.

2. TO BEGIN, WE WANT TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF
DEVELOPING AN ENTREE TO A NEWSPAPER WHICH WE CAN EITHER DIRECTLY
CONTROL OR WHICH AT LEAST WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO AN EDITORIAL
POLICY WHICH WE WOULD DICTATE. INITIALLY WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE
THE NEWSPAPER AVAILABLE TO EXPOSE AND COUNTER SOVIET INTERFERENCE
IN THE AREA, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE HQS HAS THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY
AND THE NEWSPAPER CAPABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IT SHOULD BE
RELATIVELY SIMPLE MATTER TO SHIFT ITS DIRECTION TO LOCAL
POLITICS SHOULD SUCH A REQUIREMENT BE LEVIED ON STATION.

3. THIS LEADS TO HOW TO BEGIN THE SEARCH FOR SUCH A NEWSPAPER.
ONE [redacted] COMES IMMEDIATELY TO MIND. BACK IN FEBRUARY R/4 HAD
TOLD US THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING SETTING UP A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER
AND WOULD WELCOME COVERT AMERICAN SUPPORT. HQS RESPONDED BY AD-
VISING HIM WE DOUBTED THAT SUCH AN IDEA WOULD HAVE MUCH
POTENTIAL IN ITSELF. WE SHOULD HEAR R/4 OUT ON THE DETAILS OF HIS
PROPOSAL. THIS MESSAGE WAS PASSED TO R/4 WHO SAID HE WOULD
PROVIDE THE DETAILS AT A FUTURE MEETING. IN APRIL R/4 SAID THAT
HE AND [redacted] RAH MADANI WERE PLANNING TO START SEVERAL WEEKLY
REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS AND HAD GOTTEN 2½ MILLION RIALS TOGETHER FOR
THAT PURPOSE. IN MAY STATION REPORTED THAT R/4 SAID THAT HE AND



PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 486933 S E C R E T
MADANI SHOULD START A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER IN TEHRAN IN A MONTH OR SO.

REQUEST STATION QUESTION R/4 AS TO THE STATUS OF HIS NEWSPAPER AT NEXT MEETING. AS R/4 IS ASTUTE PERSON BELIEVE WE SHOULD FRANK WITH HIM AS TO OUR REASON FOR RAISING MATTER: THAT WHILE NO POLICY TO ENGAGE IN PROPAGANDA IN IRAN HAS BEEN DECIDED UPON, WE WANT TO FULLY INVESTIGATE MATTER SO JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE ON WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING ON ANY PAPER R/4 IS PUBLISHING OR PLANS TO PUBLISH: CIRCULATION, TARGET GROUP, MEANS OF PUBLISHING, EDITORIAL DIRECTION, TYPE AND DEGREE OF GOVT CENSORSHIP AND METHOD OF FUNDING. SHOULD R/4 RAISE MATTER OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM US, PLEASE OBTAIN ESTIMATES OF WHAT HIS NEEDS WILL BE AND RETURN HIS WILLINGNESS PERMIT OUR PARTICIPATION IN SELECTION CONTENT.

5. IN ADDITION QUERYING R/4 RE HIS OWN NEWSPAPER, ALSO REQUEST YOU ASK HIM IF HE AWARE OF OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN IRAN THAT MIGHT BE AMENABLE TO COVERT SUPPORT FROM US. BESIDES IRAN, WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SUCH PUBLICATIONS IN EUROPE WHICH HAVE WIDE READERSHIP AMONG IRANIANS THERE.

6. WELCOME STATION COMMENTS.

7. FILE: 201-963527. RTW 31JUL99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

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

10 AUG 79 17

E C R E T 80446Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ITE WASHINGTON 497711, SECTION 1 OF 2.

O: TEHRAN

ROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO ADCNE, NE/INTEL, DDPDS/EG/DDO/CS

UBJECT: WNINTEL - REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR JULY REPORTS LISTED BELOW REVIEWED 15 AUGUST 1979.

S.I.B.

NII-10,659 NO OPACT TDFIRDB-315/12271-79 RATING: 5
(UNILATERAL) SDROTTER/4 SECRET/FULL CONTROLS
DISSEMINATED 10 JULY 1979
"QASHQAI POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND MILITARY CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS"
COMMENT: WHILE WE AGREE WITH FIELD COMMENT PARA ONE THAT SDROTTER/4'S ESTIMATES OF QASHQAI NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE MAY BE EXAGGERATED, HIS REPORTING ON THE QASHQAI TRIBE ITSELF IS UNIQUE. REPORT WAS USED IN ARMY'S ACSI BRIEF.

S.I.B.

NII-10,659 NO OPACT TDFIRDB-315/12267-79 RATING: 5
(UNILATERAL) SDROTTER/4 SECRET/FULL CONTROLS
DISSEMINATED 10 JULY 1979
"VIEWS OF QASHQAI LEADER ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION"
COMMENT: WE APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT SDROTTER/4 TRIES TO PRESENT A BALANCED PICTURE OF THE POLITICAL SCENE IN IRAN, AND WE CONTINUE TO SOLICIT HIS VIEWS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF KHUZESTAN GOVERNOR MADANI (DOI: EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. AS OF EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979, AYATOLLAHS MOHAMED HOSSEIN B E H E S H T I AND HASSAN L A H O U T I WERE ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I THAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERMMENT OF IRAN (PGOI) CAN BEST BE REMEDIED BY REPLACING PRIME MINISTER MEHDI B A Z A R G A N I WITH ADMIRAL AHMAD M A D A N I, CURRENTLY GOVERNOR OF KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: KHOMEINI'S DECISION, IS NOT YET KNOWN, BUT THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT KHMEINI IS PLEASED WITH MADANI'S SUCCESS IN KEEPING ARAB DISSIDENCE IN KHUZESTAN UNDER CONTROL.) (FIELD COMMENT: A RELIABLE SOURCE SAID ON 6 SEPTEMBER THAT BEHESHTI IS GENERALLY THOUGHT TO BE PERSONALLY HOSTILE TO MADANI.)

2. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW Q A S H Q A I HAS RECOMMENDED TO ADMIRAL MADANI THAT THE LATTER LEAD A MILITARY COUP AGAINST KHOMEINI AND THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. MADANI RESPONDED THAT SUCH A MOVE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PREMATURE; IN THIS CONTENT HE ALLUDED TO THE CONTINUED WEAKNESS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

3. MADANI IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. ALTHOUGH ARAB DISSIDENT ACTIVITY HAS DECLINED IN PAST WEEKS, MADANI HAS INFORMATION INDICATING THAT ORGANIZING ACTIVITY AMONT THE ARABS HAS GREATLY ACCELERATED (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE HAD NO DETAILS ON THIS SUBJECT.)

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (5 SEPTEMBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO NIT-10,715.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE (DOI: EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. ACCORDING TO QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW Q A S H Q A I THE TRIBE AND ITS ALLIES IN FARS AND ADJACENT PROVINCES HAVE A TOTAL OF 20,000 LIGHT WEAPONS. THESE ARE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY INDIVIDUAL ARMS, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ALSO A FEW MORTARS AND LIGHT MACHINE GUNS. (FIELD COMMENT: IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE CLAIMED NUMBER OF LIGHT WEAPONS IS EXAGGERATED. SEE NIT-10,658, TDFIRDB-315,12271-79, FOR EARLIER INFORMATION FROM THE SAME SOURCE ON QASHQAI ACTIVITY.) ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE FORCES IS WELL ADVANCED, AND KHOSROW QASHQAI BELIEVES THAT HE COULD MOVE AS MANY AS 20,000 QASHQAI AND ALLIED TRIBESMEN TO TEHRAN WITHIN THREE DAYS. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION ASPECTS OF SUCH A MOVE IS BEING CONDUCTED UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT THE QASHQAI MIGHT HAVE TO REACT AGAINST A THREAT TO AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I. IN FACT, QASHQAI WANTS TO BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE MILITARY FORCE TO KHOMEINI'S OVERTHROW WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT.

2. THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE QASHQAI FORCES LOYAL TO KHOSROW QASHQAI CALLS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF CONTACTS IN THE IRANIAN MILITARY; THEY SEEK ALSO TO ESTABLISH AN ALLIANCE WITH SECULAR POLITICIANS SUCH AS THE YOUNGER GENERATION IN THE NATIONAL FRONT. (SOURCE COMMENT: KHOSROW QASHQAI IS HIGHLY IMPRESSED BY SEYED J A V A D I, REGARDING HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS COMPATIBLE WITH THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE TRIBESMEN AND THE IRANIAN NATION .....ENVISAGES A REGIME SIMILAR IN POLICY LINE TO THAT OF .....PRIME MINISTER .....M O S S A D E G.) FORMER PRIME MINISTER .....B A K H T I A R HAS RECENTLY INDICATED CONTACT WITH .....THE LATTER BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO .....

WHIT BAKHTIAR

3. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE IS A PARTISAN OF KHOSROW QASHQAI... ...IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM THE ACCURACY OF HIS ....THAT SUBSTANTIALLY THE ENTIRE QASHQAI TRIBE IS LOYAL ..KHOSROW.)

4. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (5 SEPTEMBER 1979) FIELD REPORT .....

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEHRAN (CHARGE ONLY) SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV. (CHIEFS OF MISSION ONLY)
REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORGINATOR. RVW ....SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
S E C R E T



REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: BAKHTIAR EFFORTS TO GENERATE SUPPORT IN IRAN (DOI: SEPTEMBER-EARLY OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW QASHQAI HAS RECEIVED A SERIES OF MESSAGES, TRANSMITTED IN WRITTEN NOTES AND BY WORD OF MOUTH, FROM SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR. THE PURPOSE OF THESE MESSAGES IS TO SOLICIT QASHQAI SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR'S EFFORT TO BUILD AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ISLAMIC REGIME DOMINATED BY AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI SAID THE LAST NOTE FROM BAKHTIAR ARRIVED DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER.)

2. BAKHTIAR'S COMMUNICATIONS TO QASHQAI CLAIM THAT SUPPORT HAS BEEN PLEDGED BY MODERATE CLERGY INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KAZEM SHARIAT-MADARI, AND BY ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY AT ALL LEVELS IN THE OFFICER CORPS. BAKHTIAR ALSO CLAIMED SUPPORT FROM ALL THE ETHNIC MINORITIES, EXPLICITLY INCLUDING THE IRANIAN ARABS. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI SAID HE REGARDS SHARIAT-MADARI AS POLITICALLY TOO ASTUTE TO HAVE MADE ANY COMMITMENT TO THE BAKHTIAR PROGRAM. HE SAID HE DOUBTS THE ACCURACY OF BAKHTIAR'S CLAIMS TO SUPPORT IN IRAN, AND THAT HE BELIEVES BAKHTIAR IS INDULGING THE NORMAL EMIGRE TENDENCY TO OVERESTIMATE RESIDUAL SUPPORT INSIDE THE COUNTRY.)

3. BAKHTIAR HAS OFFERED THE QASHQAI TRIBE "UNLIMITED" FINANCIAL SUPPORT. HE HAS GUARANTEED THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF UP TO 500 MILLION RIALS (APPROXIMATELY U.S. DOLLARS 4.5 MILLION AT THE FREE MARKET RATE). (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI HAS SAID HE IS AS SCEPTICAL OF THE OFFER OF FINANCIAL AID AS HE IS OF BAKHTIAR'S CLAIMS TO SUPPORT INSIDE IRAN. IN GENERAL HE THINKS

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S E C R E T 121714Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 531288. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/INTEL, DPDS/EG/DDO/CS

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR REPORTS.
1. FOLLOWING ARE THE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER NIT'S 10,710 THROUGH 10,720 REVIEWED 10 OCTOBER 1979.

OBJECTIVE: S.1.B RATING: 5
FIELD NO NIT-10,713 OPACT SDROTTER
DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15614-79, 6 SEPT 1979
UNILATERAL, SOURCE SDROTTER/3, FULL CONTROLS
SUBJECT: MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE
COMMENT: THERE IS CONTINUING INTEREST IN REPORTING ON THE QASHQAI, THEIR ORGANIZATION, FACTIONS, LEADERS, LOYALTIES, ARMS ACQUISITION, AND ACTIVITY. ACCORDING TO SDPEPPER/1, THE QASHQAI ARE THE ONLY TRIBE WHICH CAN MOUNT SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION ACTIVITY (ASIDE FROM THE KURDS); HE DISCOUNTS THE BAKHTIARI. REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

OBJECTIVE: S.1.B RATING: 5
FIELD NO NIT-10,715 NO OPACT
DISSEM NO: TDFIRDB-315/15595-79, 6 SEPT 1979
UNILATERAL, SOURCE SDROTTER/4, FULL CONTROLS
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF KHUZESTAN GOVERNOR MADANI
COMMENT: THERE IS CONTINUING INTEREST IN REPORTING ON MADANI AND ATTITUDES OF KEY FIGURES TOWARD HIM. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FOLLOWUP REPORTING ON MADANI'S INFORMATION INDICATING THAT ORGANIZING ACTIVITY AMONG THE ARABS HAS GREATLY INCREASED. REPORT WAS USED IN ACSI BRIEF.

[redacted]

[redacted] SDROTTER INTEL

REF: A. TEHRAN 54473 (NIT-10,767)
B. TEHRAN 54472 (NIT-10,768)
TEHRAN 54144

AT 13 OCTOBER MEETING, SDROTTER/4 (R/4) SAID HIS PEOPLE ARE IN TOUCH WITH ARAB DISSIDENTS WHO ALSO SERVE AT LEAST OCCASIONALLY AS WEAPONS PURVEYORS TO THE [redacted] SOUTH. HE SAID HE WANTS TO HELP US [redacted] BUT THAT HE NOT IN POSITION TO BROKER [redacted] OF THESE CONTACTS. WE SAID WE WOULD SE[redacted] AND ASKED HIM ALSO FOR LOCATIONS, ORGAN[redacted] AND AS MUCH OF AN ASSESSMENT AS HE CAN P[redacted] THAT THEY WOULD BE AMENABLE T[redacted] R/4 SAID HE WILL ASSEMB[redacted]

[redacted] IF WE ARE IN T[redacted] [redacted] SUPPORT [redacted] WILL MAKE THAT

R/4 ALSO EXPECTS TO SEE MUSTAFA CHAMRAN THIS WEEK (HIS PROSPECTS DEPEND ON TIMING OF CHAMRAN'S RETURN FROM KURDISTAN). WE LEVIED REQUIREMENTS DEALING WITH MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND WITH PERSONAL ASSESSMENT.

4. R/4 ASKED, AS HE USUALLY DOES, WHAT HE AND HIS PEOPLE SHOULD DO. WE REPLIED, AS USUAL, THAT WHATEVER MAY BE THE DEFECTS OF LIFE UNDER KHOMEINI, WE ARE NOT GOING TO ENCOURA[redacted] ANY ACTIVITY WHOSE END RESULT MIGHT VERY WELL MAKE TH[redacted]

[redacted] ION, SOUNDING AS USUAL [redacted] HE NARROWER CONTEXT [redacted] E THOUGHT HE SHOULD DO [redacted] NG THE TRIBE. WE SAID [redacted] MUCH IF THE TRIBE HAD [redacted] SUCH A MOVE; R/4 SETTLED

[redacted] FILE: 201-063527. RVW 14 OCT 99 DRV DOC.1. ALL SECRET.

REPORT CLASS S E C [redacted] E --WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF KHOSROW QASHQAI ON SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS AND ON QASHQAI TRIBE POLITICAL ACTIVITY (OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW Q A S H Q A I SAID IN MID-OCTOBER 1979 THAT, OF THE FIVE MOST INFLUENTIAL LAYMEN IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI), HE REGARDS ONLY ONE A$ BEING A CONVINCED REVOLUTIONARY. THIS IS MUSTAFA C H A M R A N, MINISTER OF DEFENSE. (SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN CHAMRAN IN ABOUT TEN YEARS AND COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT HIS IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR HAD SURVIVED THROUGH THIS PERIOD.) QASHQAI SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM Y A Z D I, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SADEGH T A B A T A B A ' I AND NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION DIRECTOR SADEGH Q O T B Z A D E H ARE ESSENTIALLY OPPORTUNISTS, MORE CONCERNED WITH THE ACQUISITION AND EXERCISE OF POWER THAN WITH THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRANIAN SOCIETY ON THE BASIS OF SOME COHERENT POLITICAL PROGRAM. QASHQAI EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONTEMPT FOR QOTBZADEH, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS FOR SALE TO ANYONE WHO PROVIDES HIM THE LUXURIES AND PERQUISITES HE CRAVES.

2. OF YAZDI, QASHQAI SAID THAT HE IS MORE COMPLICATED THAN QOTBZADEH, VERY AMBITIOUS AND DEFINITELY NOT A REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUE. KHOSROW SAID THAT HE REGARDS TABATABA'I AS MOTIVATED BY SELF-INTEREST AS MUCH AS THE OTHERS; HE SAID THAT HE VIEWS INTERIOR MINISTER HASHEMI S A B B A G H I A N AS THE OTHER MOST INFLUENTIAL LAYMAN IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE DOES NOT THINK HIM TO BE MORE REVOLUTIONARY THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, YAZDI. KHOSROW ADDED THAT HE REGARDS ALL FIVE OF THESE OFFICIALS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I FOR THEIR POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE, SAYING THAT, AS LONG-TIME EXILES,



HEY HAVE NO PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES INSIDE IRAN.

3. QASHQAI SAID THAT HE CONTINUES TO DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR
HE QASHQAI TRIBE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. HE CLAIMED
THAT NEW CONTACTS HAVE BEEN MADE AMONG BOTH ACTIVE DUTY AND
ESPECIALLY RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS. HE SAID THAT CONTACT CONTINUES
ITH GROUND FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF [illegible] I F A L L A H I, AND THAT
THE PURPOSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP IS TO PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES
SUCH AS THE DEATH OR DISABILITY OF KHOMEINI. QASHQAI SAID THAT
FALLAHI HAS NEVER EXPLICITLY INDICATED HOSTILITY TO KHOMEINI
AND THE ISLAMIC STYLE OF GOVERNMENT.

4. QASHQAI SAID THAT THE GOI HAS QUIETLY BUT
FORMALLY CANCELLED ORDERS FOR THE DISARMAMENT OF THE QASHQAI
TRIBE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LETTER TO COM AFTER THE
ORDER WAS PUBLISHED, ARGUING THAT SECURITY OF THE QASHQAI
AREA IS BEST SERVED BY ALLOWING TRIBESMEN TO KEEP THEIR
ARMS. ACCORDING TO QASHQAI, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
ORDERED THE GOVERNMENT IN EARLY [illegible] TO KEEP NOT TO PURSUE ITS
ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO TRY TO DISARM THE QASHQAI. (SOURCE
COMMENT: QASHQAI ESTIMATED THAT MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF THE
QASHQAI WOULD HAVE CONSENTED TO GIVE UP THEIR ARMS WITHOUT A
FIGHT.) (FIELD COMMENT: QASHQAI MAY HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO
THE CAMPAIGN TO RECOVER UNAUTHORIZED WEAPONS ANNOUNCED BY THE
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AND THE VIOLENCE WHICH
FOLLOWED THE CLOSING OF THE LIBERAL NEWSPAPER "AYANDEGAN" IN
MID-AUGUST.)

5. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (NIACT) OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO.
NIT-10,768.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN.
SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT,
NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
releasable to contractors or consultants. dissemination
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THE EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.
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ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION
DOCUMENT.
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

WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

OF QASHQAI LEADER ON HIS MEETING WITH KHOMEINI
CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (DOI: LATE OCTOBER

MEMBER OF THE QASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR
QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY
HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. SUMMARY: IN LATE OCTOBER 1979, QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW
WITH [illegible] SAID HE HAD HAD A PRIVATE MEETING AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE
HIS [illegible] OLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I ON 25 OCTOBER. HE SAID
[illegible] TELEGRAM TO KHOMEINI REQUESTING THE MEETING HAD ALLUDED TO THE
MISCONDUCT OF SOME CLERGYMEN, AND THAT HE ELABORATED ON THIS THEME
DURING THEIR MEETING. HE SAID KHOMEINI LISTENED, AND WAS CORDIAL
THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, BUT DID NOT REPLY TO THE COMPLAINTS.
(SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI DID NOT SAY WHAT, IF ANY, SPECIFIC CASES
HE HAD PRESENTED TO KHOMEINI.) KHOMEINI REFERRED TO THE SITUATION
IN KHUZESTAN, PRAISING GOVERNOR AHMAD M A D A N I FOR HIS WORK
THERE. HE ASKED QASHQAI TO ENLIST HIS TRIBE'S RESOURCES
TO HELP MADANI CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN. (SOURCE
COMMENT: MADANI HAD SEEN KHOMEINI ON 24 OCTOBER.)

2. ACCORDING TO QASHQAI, THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS (PASDARAN) FROM BANDAR ANZALI AFTER THE RECENT DISTURBANCES
THERE WAS ORDERED BY MADANI. HE SAID THAT THIS INCIDENT HAS
INTENSIFIED THE PASDARAN LEADERSHIP'S RESENTMENT OF MADANI, WHO HAD
PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED FIRM CONTROLS ON PASDARAN ACTIVITY IN KHUZESTAN.
(SOURCE COMMENT: QASHQAI SEEMED TO BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT
DEFENSE MINISTER MUSTAFA C H A M R A N IS ALSO HOSTILE TO MA
BUT OFFERED NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS BELIEF.) (FIELD CO
THE PORT OF BANDAR ANZALI, FORMERLY BANDAR PAHLAVI, WAS PL
NAVY CONTROL AFTER A SERIES OF CLASHES BETWEEN FISHERMEN
REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PASDA
REPORTED IN THE PRESS.)



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SDROTTER/4. KHOSROW QASHQAI. QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER. RESIDES SHIRAZ. MARITAL STATUS UNKNOWN. AGE 50-55. RESIDED W. GERMANY AND U.S. BEFORE REVOLUTION.

Met in Tehran approximately every three to four weeks, either in his hotel room or picked up by car. Used Sheraton and Inter-Continental hotels.

Purpose of Contact: 1) To acquire sources of information on Khuzestani Arabs, including organization, leadership, and any involvement with or support from Iraq; 2) Information on the security situation in Fars and Khuzestan Provinces; 3) Political plans of Admiral Madani.

Re 1): In October, Mr. Q said he had been informed about two Khuzestani Arabs, smugglers by trade, who might be able to provide the desired information. Mr. Q was to provide names and other pertinent data in November. Re 2): Mr. Q provided information on his efforts both to guard against threats to the Revolution and to avoid the stationing of Pasdaran and Komitehs among the Qashqai people. Described efforts to acquire friends for the Qashqai tribe among military officers and in the person of Adm. Madani. Re 3) Mr. Q described Madani's interest in seeking the Presidency of the Republic under the new constitution.

Mr. Q described the weekly newspaper he wanted to sponsor in cooperation with Admiral Madani. Most of the information involved the reasons for continued postponement of publication, primarily the absence from Iran of the proposed editor (name not known). Paper was to be published in Tehran in about 70,000 copies per edition. We were interested, in principle, in

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SDROTTER/4.

supporting a publication which would seek to broaden the Revolution's base of support and, if possible, promote reconciliation between Iran and the US, but as of 4 November no support for this venture had been offered or requested.

Payment: None. A U.S. visa was obtained for Mr. Q's sister.

Kareem Sanjabi:

The documents indicate that the C. I. A. was interested in talking to Sanjabi on the condition that he would not subsequently insist on meeting the Security Council or the White House. With the approval of the U. S. State Dartment, the C. I. A. intended to send one of their agents in the guise of a high ranking official form the State Department's special desk dealing with Iranian affairs to meet him, but due to his ill-health this meeting did not materialize untill Shahrivar 20 (September 11). The subsequent telegram about Sanjabi is dated Aban 8 (October 30), and as the documents referred to in the above-mentioned document could not be traced materialization or non-materialization of this meeting is not known. The documents in this section indicate that Sam Sanjabi, the son of Karim, was working as a contact for the C. I. A. and his father himself had a very close association with the C. I. A.



S E C R E T 312001Z JUL 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 466014.

TO: IMMEDIATE FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA TORRES

REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25077

1. HQS IS INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH FARIM SANJABI PROVIDING SANJABI IS NOT MAKING SEPARATE OVERTURNS TO SEE SECURITY COUNCIL/WHITE HOUSE, WHICH WE WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY DUPLICATING. HAVE INFORMED STATE DEPARTMENT OF SANJABI'S ARRIVAL AND EFFECTED PRELIMINARY COORDINATION RE MEETING HIM. STATE WAS UNAWARE OF SANJABI'S PLANS TO TRAVEL U.S. FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.

2. WILL ADVISE RE IDENTITY OF HQS. OFFICER TO PARTICIPATE COVER WOULD BE SENIOR U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST ON IRAN. AGREE RE VENUE AND TIMING PROPOSED PARA TWO REF.

3. FILE: 201-961440. RVW 31JUL99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

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CITE TEHRAN 53879

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25..2

1. AGREE SANJABIS WOULD PROBABLY USE INFO ON YAZDI CITIZENSHIP TO DISCREDIT HIM. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO STATION AND MISSION UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE WITH RESPECT TO PGOI, AND WE THINK IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO PROVIDE ANY SUCH INFO, REGARDLESS OF ITS PROVENANCE.

2. FILE: 2Ø1-Ø96... RVW 9 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T



11 Aug 79

S E C R E T 1021327Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 492905.

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53879
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25140

1. CONCUR REF A REGARDING INAPPROPRIATENESS OF REACTION FULFILLING SANJABI REQUEST. BASE SHOULD NOT PUT ITSELF IN POSITION OF AIDING SANJABI ON THIS.

2. FILE: 231-961440. RVW 10AUG99 DRV DGC.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#1853



2 Sep 79

S E C R E T 112355Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25830

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25140
B. TEHRAN 53879

1. KARIM SANJABI IS RECUPERATING AT THE HOME OF HIS SON, SAM SANJABI, IN CHICO, CALIFORNIA. UNFORTUNATELY, HE HAS AN UNDIAGNOSED INFECTION WITH HIGH FEVER WHICH HAS NOT YET RESPONDED TO ANTIBIOTICS AND IS IN NO CONDITION FOR AN INTERVIEW. SAM ESTIMATES AT LEAST A WEEK MORE OF TREATMENT AND REST WILL BE NECESSARY BEFORE KARIM IS FIT TO TALK. WILL ADVISE.

2. SAM PERSISTS IN REQUEST FOR INFO ON YAZDI'S NATURALIZATION. WE TOLD HIM DOCUMENTS SUCH AS HE REQUESTED WERE PROTECTED BY THE PRIVACY ACT. SAM SAID HE WOULD NOT NEED DOCUMENTATION, ONLY THE BASIC FACTS OF DATE AND PLACE OF YAZDI'S NATURALIZATION, WHICH HE ARGUES SHOULD BE MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD. IF THIS IS PUBLIC RECORD INFORMATION, SUGGEST HQS OBTAIN IT AND PASS TO SAM SANJABI TO EASE INTRODUCTION TO HQS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-[illegible]1440. RVW 11SEP99 DRV DGC1 BY 033151. ALL SECRET

S E C R E T
BT
#9827

310CT79 09 05Z

S E C R E T 301700Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25591

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

WNINTEL AJAJA

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25330
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25450 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. ACCORDING TO HIS SON, SAM, DR. KARIM SANJABI RECEIVED A CALL FROM ALI ARDALAN (A RELATIVE, A KURD, AND PRESENT MINISTER OF FINANCE) SEVERAL DAYS AGO INVITING HIS EARLY RETURN TO IRAN. DR. SANJABI LEFT CALIFORNIA 28 OCTOBER FOR A BRIEF STOP WITH HIS OTHER SON IN ILLINOIS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO EUROPE TO SEE IRANIAN EXILE CONTACTS THERE. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO TEHRAN ON OR ABOUT 7 NOVEMBER.

2. SAM, ON BASIS OF TALKS WITH HIS FATHER, SPECULATES REASONS FOR SUMMONS MAY BE:

A. TO AID THE GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE KURDISH PROBLEM THROUGH HIS AUTHORITY WITH THE SANJABI TRIBE.
B. TO ASSIST THE FALTERING BAZARGAN GOVT OR ITS SUCCESSOR IN A POSITION SUCH AS CHIEF OF THE CABINET. KARIM SANJABI SAID HE WOULD REFUSE ANY CABINET POST UNLESS HE WERE GUARANTEED THE AUTHORITY TO GO WITH THE TITLE. HE WANTS NO REPEAT OF HIS SHORT TERM AS FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. DR. SANJABI'S HEALTH IS MUCH IMPROVED AND HE GAINED A LITTLE WEIGHT WHILE RESTING IN CHICO.

4 SAM PROMISED TO INFORM US OF ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

5. FILE: 201-0951440. RVW 30OCT99 DRV D9C1 BY 033151. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#2349



REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: DARIOUSH FOROUHAR'S REMARKS ON IRANIAN CABINET SHUFFLE (DOI: 29 SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: A GENERALLY RELIABLE IRANIAN BUSINESS EXECUTIVE.

1. ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1979, DARIOUSH FOROUHAR SAID THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO POSITION IN THE NEW IRANIAN CABINET BECAUSE THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WANTED THE BENEFIT OF HIS PRESTIGE IN THE CABINET. FOR HIS PART, FOROUHAR DID NOT WANT TO CONTINUE AT THE HEAD OF ANY SPECIFIC MINISTRY FOR FEAR OF BEING ACCUSED AND INVESTIGATED AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, LIKE HASSAN NAZIH, FORMER CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. (FIELD COMMENT: PRIOR TO THE CABINET SHAKEUP, FOROUHAR WAS MINISTER OF LABOR.)

2. FOROUHAR SAID THAT THE FORMER MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION, DR. ALI SHARIATI-MADARI, WAS NOT ON THE LIST OF MINISTERS TO BE CHANGED ORIGINALLY, BUT SHARIATI-MADARI HAD SUBMITTED HIS OWN RESIGNATION ON 27 SEPTEMBER IN PROTEST AGAINST THE OTHER CABINET CHANGES. (SOURCE COMMENT: DR. ALI SHARIATI-MADARI IS A DISTANT RELATIVE OF THE WELL-KNOWN AYATOLLAH KAZEM SHARIATI-MADARI).

3. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (1 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. NIT-10,753.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN. SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 1 OCT 99 DRV D9C1. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
S E C R E T

TEHRAN 54368 (NIT-10,753)

1. SDVALID/1 (V/1) OBTAINED REF DIRECTLY FROM DARIOUSH FOROUHAR ON 29 SEPTEMBER, WHEN HE MET HIM AT HOME OF HIS FRIEND JAVAD VATANI. VATANI AND FOROUHAR ARE OLD FRIENDS BECAUSE THEY WERE IN PRISON TOGETHER IN THE SHAH'S ERA.

2. FOROUHAR ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WILL RECEIVE DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS:

SARAF YAZI -- CHARGE IN BANGLADESH

ALI RASOULI -- CHARGE IN SENEGAL

NADER SHAHSAD -- CHARGE IN ROME ✓ already confirmed

GHASEM EFTEKARI -- CHARGE IN BRASILIA

AHMAD HOSSAINI FARD -- PRESS OFFICER IN EAST BERLIN

3. ACCORDING TO FOROUHAR, THE FOLLOWING PERSONS ARE ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: BANI-SADR, GHOTBZADEH, AYATOLLAH KHAMENEI AND AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI. SDVALID/1 WAS NOT CERTAIN FROM FOROUHAR'S REMARKS WHETHER HE MEANT THAT THESE ARE THE ONLY PERSONS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

Real Name: Ali Saifpur Fatemi.

Code Name: S. D. Market.

S. D. Market (Ali Saifpur Fatemi) was a professor of economics at an American university and was employed as source of information on the political matters of Iran in Azar 58 (November 1979). His secret motive in working for the C. I. A. was that America should continue to support the Iranian moderates, so that through them a solution to the political problems of Iran could be found. He was residing in America as a permanent resident and had visited Iran several times in connection with his work at the International Training Centre of Iran.

In view of the information given by another spy about S. D. Market to the C. I. A. official to the effect that in all probability the charges of embezzlement, misappropriation and corruption against Ardshir Zahidi are also directed towards him (S. D. Market), the C. I. A. considered the probable dangers threatening him and did not intend to exert more pressure on him by making further contact.

4 Apr 79 04 55z

S E C R E T 1404212 APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 419468. SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: ROME INFO TEHRAN.

WWINTEL RYBAT AJAJA BGHAWK.

REF: TEHRAN 52649

1. PER REF REQUEST, FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF CASES LAATSCH MAY BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE IN TEHRAN:

A. SDMARKET/1 (M/1); AGE 43. PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT U.S. UNIVERSITY. TRAVELLED FREQUENTLY TO TEHRAN TO WORK WITH IRAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION (ICIE). AN IRANIAN INTELLECTUAL WHO WAS ACTIVE IN NON-COMMUNIST ANTI-SHAH GROUPS OUTSIDE IRAN UNTIL LATE 1960'S. WAS RECRUITED DEC 78 AS SOURCE OF INFO ON IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION. HAS IMPRESSIVE RANGE OF CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL FRONT AND MODERATE CIRCLES WHO HE SEES TO OBTAIN INFO ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS. MOTIVATION IS STRONG BELIEF THAT USG MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT IRAN WHILE MODERATES TRY TO FIND SOLUTION TO SITUATION. AN UNPAID AGENT ALTHOUGH APPROVAL GRANTED JAN 79 FOR ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE OR LOAN OF RIALS 300,000 TO PAY LOCAL ICIE STAFF. MEETINGS INVOLVE TAXIS OR CAR PICKUPS, RESTAURANT MEETINGS, ETC. USE OF COMMO GEAR AUTHORIZED. HOWEVER UNIT NO LONGER IN HIS POSSESSION (STATION RETRIEVED IT AS OF 12 MARCH 79 DUE LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION). SDMARKET/1 IS INTELLIGENT AND ARTICULATE MAN WHOSE PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. SINCE MANY OF HIS FRIENDS HAVE BEEN JAILED, AND IN SOME CASES EXECUTED, SDMARKET/1, A DUAL [illegible] PLANS TO DEPART TEHRAN AS SOON AS GOVERNMENT ALLOWS IRANIAN MALES TO LEAVE. HAS AGREED TO MEET WITH RTACTIO IN U.S.

2. NO FILE. RVW 13 APR 99 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T



E T 5/1052 MAR 79 STAFF

EHR 5251/4 (PLANTINGA ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

NTEL YEAR SDMARKET

1. SDMARKET/1 (M/1) (M/1) CONTINUES TO PLAN TO LEAVE IRAN S SOON AS HE IS ABLE. HE HOPES BY EARLY APRIL 79.

M/1 WILL EXPECT A CALL FROM GLEGOROFF IF M/1 STILL HERE AFTER GLEGOROFF'S ARRIVAL. IF M/1 ABLE LEAVE IN NEAR FUTURE, WE HAVE ARRANGED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM IN THE U.S. THROUGH HIS WIFE. WE HAVE TENATIVELY AGREED THAT M/1 WILL TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON FOR A THOROUGH DEBRIEFING SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN THE U.S.

3. FOR THE RECORD, M/1 HAS CHANGED HIS OFFICE LOCATION. NEW OFFICE TELEPHONE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE IS IDEN.

4. FILE: DEFER. RVW 2 MAR 79. DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T



E 26/1002Z MAR 79 STAFF
H 5/2215 (PLANTING ACTING)
RITY DIRECTOR.
RYBAT SDMARKET
TEHRAN 52514
IRAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION.
PHONES: 625-0[illegible]3
625-[illegible]5A
OFFICE LOCATED AT NORTHEAST CORNER, INTERSECTION OF
TAKHT-TAVOUS AND SHAH ABBAS. BUILDING HAS 5 FLOORS.
SIGNS ON FRONT ENTRANCE. CA BANK OCCUPIES GROUND FL
RVW 26MAR99 DRU DEC/ SECRET
S E C R E T



R [illegible]1Z MAY 79 STAFF
TEHRAN 5311A (GLEGGOROFF ACTING)
DIRECTOR
SYMBOL SDMARKET/SDRIGHT
1. NEURLOTTE ELICITED FROM SDRIGHT/I T MAY THAT SDMARKET/
IS LYING VERY LOW IN TEHRAN PRIMARILY BECAUSE HE FEARS LOCAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF HIS PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH ARDESHIR ZAHEDI.
R/I CLAIMS M/I HAD BEEN GIVEN MONEY BY ZAHEDI FOR CERTAIN AGRI-
CULTURAL PROJECTS WHICH NEVER GOT OFF GROUND. THERE ARE SUS-
PICIONS REGARDING WHAT HAPPENED TO
THE MONEY. R/I IS OF OPINION THAT M/I WANTS TO ESCAPE TO UK.
2. AS DESIRABLE AS IT WOULD BE TO TRY TO GET M/I BACK IN
REPORTING RELATIONSHIP, STATION CAN SYMPATHIZE WITH M/I'S WORRY
AND IS RELUCTANT TO PRESS HIM. CRIMES OF ALLEGED "CORRUPTION"
AND SERVICE TO THE LUMINARIES OF FORMER REGIME ARE INDEED
SERIOUS, SOMETIMES TERMINAL. UNLESS HQS BELIEVES WE SHOULD
LEAN HARD ON M/I TO RESUME RELATIONSHIP, WE INCLINED TO HONOR
M/I'S JUDGMENT THAT CONTACTS TOO RISKY FOR HIM NOW.
3. FILE: 20[illegible] RVW 17 MAY 99 DRU DEC/ ALL
SECRET.
S E C R E T



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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

20 flw OUTGOING Ambassy TEHRAN

TOR-3 GP-4 CONFIDENTIAL

AMB DCM — Classification — Control: 9/589

ECON SA CR USIS USAID/ LAST OCS-3 — Charge: — Date: SEPT. 28, 1963 HTU: 1700

FILES-2 CR — ACTION: SECSTATE WASHINGTON 517

POUCH: — REF.: (a) Deptel 843 and Embtel 957 of May 15, 1962
(b) Embtel 306 and Deptel 221, Sept., 1963
(c) Para. 5 Dept. CAT 2, Sept. 6, 1963.

ISFAHAN KHORRAM. MESHED TABRIZ

Believe time has come press once more for deportation Iranian students Ali Seifpur FATEMY (corrected 10/2/63 JH) and Sadeq QOTBZADEH on ground that they are in United States without valid Iranian passports. As Department aware these students are deeply involved in political activities against Iranian Government and there appears to be good legal case against them.

When this matter last discussed as per reference (a), the Department asked Embassy obtain assurances from Prime Minister that in case they returned to Iran they would not be prosecuted for any acts committed up to that time. Subsequently Embassy as per Embtel 957 did obtain such assurances from Shah himself. We have no reason to doubt continued validity these assurances and could if necessary remind Government of them.

Timeliness of renewed action with Justice Department is suggested by recent incident with student agitators involving Iranian Foreign Minister as per Ref (b). Although Embassy has received no evidence that they were personally involved in this latest disturbance, we strongly feel that action on Fatemi and Qotbzadeh would have salutary effect on other Iranian students in US.



GP-4 CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

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TELEGRAM Foreign Ser... United States of Americ...

OUTGOING

GP-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Charge: Control: 9/389

-2- Date:

Timeliness is further suggested by recent information on INS position contained ref (c) notably sentence that "Department has been informally told by the (Immigration and Naturalization) Service that it probably would not grant a further extension of stay to a student in such circumstances", i.e., when his Iranian passport has not been extended.

HOLMES

POL:MFHara/eet
Sept. 28, 1963

Clearance
CONS: JFlorens (Draft)

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TELEGRAM Foreign Service... United States of Americ...

10/ INCOMING AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL GP-4
Classification

Control: 12/399

Rec'd: Dec. 26, 1963 06:00 A.M.

ACTION:
CON...
L.FO:
CHARGE
AMB
POL-3
CMU-2
CR

	Action	Infor.	INT
DAL		✓	M
LCN	✓		✓
AMB	✓		✓
JL		✓	
LF		✓	
FK		✓	

FROM: DEPARTMENT

NO: 457, DECEMBER 24, 5PM

RE EMBTEL 317

Fatemi and Gotbzadeh were called in today to office of Commissioner Of Immigration and Naturalization who issued them strong warning to cease troublesome activities or face legal action to enforce departure as is normal in the case of aliens without valid passports. Warning issued in name of Attorney General, whom Commissioner described as "disappointed" that past leniency shown at his instance had not resulted in more behavior on the part of the Iranian Students' Association. Fatemi and Gotbzadeh were told that they are expected to use their influence in that association to prevent others from engaging in troublesome activities and to spread the word that any student without valid passport must control behavior or face appropriate legal action.

Indicated activities were specified as: harrassment and insulting of visiting Iranian dignitaries; forced entry into Iranian diplomatic premises; and distribution of Communist literature.

Above procedure was worked out as result of letter from Secretary to Attorney General. Today's warning was issued in presence of HEW Representative, who was invited to reinforce points made by Commissioner.

Unclassified cleared memo of conversation of today's session will be pouched as soon as possible. Have informed Foroughi of meeting, as he has frequently inquired, at Aram's behest, as to action we were taking to curb student activities.

FYI. The two students, while expressing innocence and justifying political activities as within their rights, nevertheless appeared shaken by session and impressed with evidence that there has been a change in United States Government stance toward them. They probed here for signs of differences between State and Justice positions, but received no evidence thereof. Fatemi has applied for change of status to permanent resident, on basis wife is naturalized U.S. citizen, but he did not press this case today; we hope/.....

0730/rp

CONFIDENTIAL GP-4
Classification

FORM DS-504
2-21-58

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FATEMI and Gotbzadeh

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457 CONFIDENTIAL
GR-4

we hope to delay, if not prevent, such change of status by investigations of Communist literature distribution and ISA source of funds. End FYI.

RUSK

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GR-4

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TELEGRAM

United States

OUTGOING AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

GR-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Control: 12/2

Date: Dec.

RTU

Charge:

Embassy

ACTION: SECSTATE 595

Deptel 457

Iranian Students

When I conveyed information reftel to Hoveida today, he expressed great appreciation and asked me convey to Dept his gratitude and that of Foreign Ministry. He particularly wished have his thanks conveyed to Secretary for personally taking such construction action in this case.

10/ek
CHARGE-2
AMB
POL-3
GOR
GR-4

ROCKWELL

GR/Rockwell:mrw
12/28/63

TEHR

ROUTING

	Action	Infor.	INT.
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Washington

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

July 12, 1966

Martin F. Herz, Esquire
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
American Embassy
Tehran

Dear Martin:

Yesterday Ali Fatemi's attorney called to say the Immigration Service had granted Fatemi's request to change his status to that of permanent resident. This was later confirmed by L/SCA, which maintains liaison with the INS. When I mentioned our interest, for political reasons, in knowing in advance about decisions of this kind, I was told that no doubt the Special Inquiry Officer, acting in a quasi-judicial manner, simply informs the applicant once the decision is made. Fortunately, the decision was not based on a claim that Fatemi would be persecuted if he were deported to Iran. Most probably the decision, as in similar cases, was because Fatemi has an American citizen wife and child, on whom Fatemi's deportation might work a hardship.

The Department continued throughout the proceedings to maintain its position, originally stated in 1964, that a change of status would have an adverse effect on our relations with Iran. We were overruled by the INS which has the responsibility under the law for making decisions like this.

While this is certainly unfortunate in terms of our foreign relations, Don Schmeyer and I believe that the Department employed every legitimate administrative resource at its command, short of claiming overriding national interest, to see to it that the responsible agency was fully aware of the foreign policy aspects of the case. We would of course be interested in learning of any reaction in Tehran.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

eby L/SCA

S/ Franklin J. Crawford
Iranian Affairs

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SECRET

July 19, 1966

The Ambassador

POL - Martin Herz

INS Action on Ali FATEMI

Ali Mohammad Seif Pur FATEMI, the subject of the attached letters, has been President of Iranian student organizations in the U.S. and the power behind the two nationalist oriented Iranian student publications Iran Emruz and Donesh-ju. He has been involved in numerous anti-regime activities, notably the anti-Shah sit-in at the Iranian Embassy in Washington in January 1963 and demonstrations at the United Nations in September and October of the same year. The Iranian Embassy, which in 1961 had refused to renew Fatemi's passport because of his anti-Shah political activities in the U.S., in 1963 refused to renew his student permit.

Fatemi was born on 15 May 1935 in Isfahan and is the nephew of Prime Minister Mossadeq's Foreign Minister, Dr. Hosein Fatemi, who was executed on 10 November 1954. The Fatemi family, motivated in large measure by a desire for revenge following the execution of their kinsman, are perhaps the hardest core group of anti-Shah Iranians. Ali, a "student", is married to the former Jaleh Amire Tahmasebi (an Iranian national who became a naturalized U.S. citizen) and is resident in New Jersey.

In September 1964 the New Jersey District Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization turned down his application for a change of status to permanent resident and advised him that if he did not depart the U.S. voluntarily before October 15, 1964, his departure would be enforced. Upon receipt of the INS note, Ali Fatemi accompanied by his uncle Nasrollah Fatemi, a professor at Fairleigh Dickenson University at Madison, New Jersey, requested the assistance of New Jersey's Senator Case to stay the INS deportation order on the grounds that Fatemi would be subjected to persecution if returned to Iran. Ali Fatemi, who is also acquainted with and enjoys the friendship of Justice William Douglas and Senator Robert Kennedy, apparently was able to block the 1964 deportation efforts of the INS.

There are reports that Ali Fatemi met Ahmed Ben Bella at the United Nations in 1963 and favorably impressed the former Algerian President who invited

GDS/NP 1
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

SECRET

FATEMI, Ali Mohammad Seif Pur

SECRET

-2-

him to visit Algeria. Following this meeting, the Algerian embassy in Washington reportedly issued an Algerian passport to Ali who then went to Algeria where he reportedly underwent paramilitary training. Ali is also reported to have made several trips to Europe during 1964 and 1965 contacting various National Front and other opposition elements, but the documentation he used to travel from and re-enter the US is not known.

POL:DeSmaldone:jas:8:7/19/66

DIST (OUTSIDE):

1. Amb - Mr. Tomseth
2. DCM
3. POL - Dunjo
4. POL - Handley
5. POL - Cole
6. POL - Lissfelt

SECRET

Real Name: Touraj Nasseri.

Code Name: S. D. Paquin.

Touraj Nasseri was a professor at the Sahrif Technical University and had contacts with the C. I. A. before the Revolution and had sent three reports to the C. I. A. till the fall of Bakhtiyar. Following the Revolution due to the security problems a time gap appeared in his relationship with the C. I. A., but after the Revolution the C. I. A. decided to reestablish contacts with him. During his telephone contact with Ganjian (code name of one of the C. I. A. agents at Tehran Station) he told him that he was a member of the purging committee of the Sharif Technical University and could not visit him in person for security reasons but would like to continue telephone contacts.

In the documents collected from the political section of the Espionage Den concerning the moderates, there is a document dated February 12/78, mentioning the meeting of Dr. Touraj Nasseri with John Stempel, one of the officials of the political section.

Touraj Nasseri was responsible for introducing his brother Faridun (S. D. Paquin/1) to Ganjian (a C. I. A. agent). In Mordad 1357 (July 1978) Faridun was an assistant to the Interior Minister and was his deputy in the Budget and Planning Organization. In Shahrivar 1357 (August 1978) he became an official employee of the C. I. A., and it was decided that $750 would be deposited in his bank account every month. He supplied information about the plans and aims of the Iranian government, proceedings of the Cabinet and gave political reports. He also used to receive information from his friends in the army and other military and intelligence agencies.



1 MAY 79 ? 30Z

S E C R E T 302159Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 429010.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL SDCARAWAY

1. STATION MAY WANT TO CONSIDER RECONTACT WITH SDCARAWAY/1 (C/1) (IDEN A) WHO IS PROFESSOR AT (IDEN B). C/1 IS BROTHER OF SDPYCAN/1 (P/1). AND FIRST INTRODUCED P/1 TO GANJIAN. C/1 WAS AWARE THAT P/1 HAD CONTACTS WITH GANJIAN, BUT WAS PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF EXTENT OF P/1'S COOPERATION WITH RTACTION.

2. C/1 WAS SOURCE OF THREE REPORTS ON "INDEPENDENT" (NON-NATIONAL FRONT, NON-RELIGIOUS) OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH PRIOR TO DOWNFALL OF BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. HE WAS AWARE OF GANJIAN'S RTACTION AFFILIATION. HAD AGREED TO KEEP RELATIONSHIP CONFIDENTIAL AND DISCREET AND ACCEPTED RECONTACT PLAN(SEE PARA THREE). LAST CONTACT WITH C/1 WAS BY TELEPHONE JUST PRIOR TO GANJIAN'S DEPARTURE. C/1 SAID THAT HE WAS MEMBER OF "COMMITTEE" AT IDEN B, AND THAT THEY WERE INVESTIGATING FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAD HAD CONNECTION WITH IDEN B. C/1 DECLINED PERSONAL MEETING BECAUSE OF SECURITY SITUATION, BUT EXPRESSED INTENTION TO MAINTAIN CONTACT BY TELEPHONE. C/1 HAD INTELLECTUAL TENDENCY TO DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL TALK TO GENERAL TRENDS AND FACTS OF IRANIAN POLITICS, BUT AT SAME TIME HE DID PROVIDE FACTUAL INFO OF INTEL VALUE. C/1 IN ANY CASE IMPRESSED AS BRIGHT, ARTICULATE INDIVIDUAL WITH LONG-RANGE POLITICAL INTERESTS. DEPENDING ON HIS PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, HE MAY BE WILLING TO ACCEPT CONTACT WITH RTACTION OFFICER.

3. SUBJECT REF AGREED TO RESPOND TO ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO USES KEY PHRASE "BRITISH GYPSUM". IF HE HAS FORGOTTEN PAROLE, HE SHOULD RESPOND TO ANYONE WHO IDENTIFIES SELF AS FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE OF GANJIAN (TRUE NAME). MEETING SITE SHOULD BE ARRANGED ON INITIAL CONTACT.

4. FILE: 201-0958854. RNW 30 APRIL 99 DRV DOC.1 ALL

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

1 MAY 79 ? 40Z

S E C R E T 302216Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 429028.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 429010

1. HEREWITH REF IDENTITIES: S E R I
IDEN A - DR. TOURAJ N A S S E R I
IDEN B - ARYAMEHR TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, PLOT 907, PHASE
IDEN C - HOME ADDRESS: SHAHRAZ GHARB, PLOT 9228
HOME TELEPHONE: 6892228 RPT 6892228
OFFICE TELEPHONE: 6[illegible]511 RPT 9185A/V.

2. FILE: 201-0958854. RNW 28 APRIL 99 DRV DOC.1 ALL

SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#3072

4 Apr 79 0455Z

S E C R E T 140421Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 419468. SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: ROME INFO TEHRAN.

UNITEL RYBAT AMAJA BCHAMM.

REF: TEHRAN 52649

1. PER REF REQUEST, FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF CASES LAATSCH MAY BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE IN TEHRAN:

B. SOPECANV/1. AGE 44. IN AUG 1978 WAS UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE AND RANKING DEPUTY MINISTER, RBO, FOR BUDGET AFFAIRS. HIS PRESENT STATUS IN THE RGOI IS STILL UNCERTAIN. HE HAS RESIGNED HIS POSITION AND MUST FACE INVESTIGATION BY THE NEW REGIME; BECAUSE OF THIS HE HAS REQUESTED NO MEETINGS UNTIL LATE APRIL 1979. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED 27 APRIL. HE WISHES TO RETAIN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH STATION, THOUGH HE WOULD PREFER TO NOT HAVE TO MEET CLANDESTINELY. HE WAS SPOTTED AND RECRUITED IN SEPTEMBER 1978. SINCE RECRUITMENT HE HAS PROVIDED INFO ON GOI PLANS AND INTENTIONS, CABINET ACTIVITIES, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. HE HAS ALSO OBTAINED USEFUL INFO FROM HIS CONTACTS IN MILITARY, AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. HE IS INTELLIGENT AND A GOOD REPORTER. WHILE HE HAS NOT RECEIVED FORMAL TRADECRAFT TRAINING, THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN TEHRAN HAVE CAUSED HIM TO QUICKLY GET INTO THE HABIT OF CLANDESTINE MEETINGS. HE HAS RECENTLY FOLLOWED A RECONTACT PLAN AND HAS CONDUCTED CAR MEETINGS WITH HIS NEW CASE OFFICER. HE HAS BEEN TOLD THAT OVERT RELATIONSHIP NOT POSSIBLE JUST NOW. SOPECANV/1 IS COVERED UNDER AN MOU AND IS PAID US$750 PER MONTH IN ESCROW. HE DOES NOT LOOK UPON THIS AS A SALARY BUT RATHER A CONTINGENCY FUND, TO HELP HIM OR HIS FAMILY IN TIME OF NEED. HIS FAMILY IS CURRENTLY IN LONDON. HE ALSO HAS A BROTHER IN THE UNITED STATES. IN FEB 79 HE REQUESTED AN ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE OF RIALS 1,500,000 WITH RESULTING DOLLARS TO BE DEPOSITED TO HIS BROTHER'S US BANK ACCOUNT. THIS ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGE WAS APPROVED AT THE RATE OF 97.5/$1 (PREVAILING RATE ON 27 FEB). HQE RECORDS DO NOT INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT SOPECANV/1 WAS ADVISED OF THE APPROVAL, OR OF THE RATE AT WHICH THE EXCHANGE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Fereidoun Nasseri, former Senior Deputy Minister of Labor and Welfare
Matthew P. Ward, United States-Iran Joint Commission Officer, American Embassy Tehran

DATE & PLACE: 12:00 p.m., June 21, 1977; Chez Maurice, Hilton Hotel

SUBJECTS : Dr. Nasseri's Future Plans; the Status of the United States-Iran Joint Commission; and Manpower in Iran.

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Nasseri, Fereidoun

After initial pleasantries, Ward asked Nasseri why he choose to leave the Ministry of Labor and if he planned to continue a government career. Nasseri emphasized his respect for the new Minister of Labor, Manuchehr Azmoun, repeating several times that he was well qualified for the position. He pointed out however, as he has for nearly six months, that he and Dr. Azmoun disagree on some fundamental questions concerning the organization of the Ministry and that, as far as their two personalities were concerned, there is a basic "difference de gout." Thus, his departure from the Ministry was inescapable. Moreover, Nasseri pointed out he has been a Senior Deputy Minister for over three years and he is interested in something better (namely a ministry of his own). The question of whether he continues in the government or finds employment elsewhere has not been settled. Nasseri wishes Prime Minister Hoveyda's "blessings" before leaving government service altogether. He explained to Ward that he did not wish to leave the public with the impression that he was leaving government service because in the last round of appointments of cabinet ministers he was not named. Nasseri claims to believe that high ranking government officials should regularly be transferred to positions in the private sector and successful executives in the private sector be brought into the Iranian Government, thus, constantly renewing the pool of management expertise available to both sectors. Nasseri would prefer a job in the

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private sector but will remain in government service if the Prime Minister insists.

Nasseri confided in Ward that he has been offered the Governor Generalship of either Isfahan or Shiraz, whichever he would prefer. Though he is not interested in living in the "provinces." As Nasseri explains it, the logistics of maintaining a fully staffed residence in a provincial capitol, in Tehran, and in London is too much of a headache. Nasseri has also been asked by his old friend Dr. Shojaedin Sheikholeslamzadeh, Minister of Health, to assume the responsibilities as manager of Iran's billion dollar a year Social Services Fund. This Fund is the largest single investment fund in Iran and the position of Director brings with it several fringe benefits including a $3,000 a month salary, twice the salary which Nasseri earned as Deputy Minister of Labor. Nevertheless, Nasseri said he would prefer to leave government service altogether and work in the private sector. He claims he has been offered the position of consultant to a large multi-national firm, which he would not name, at a salary of $10,000 a month.

Government Operations in Iran

Ward asked of Nasseri if he had noticed in the past three years any changes, good or bad, in the organization and operation of the Iranian Government. Nasseri began his reply by stating that there were certain things in Persia that would never change and that there are certain things about governments that would never change. Ministries still tended to be private fiefs of ministers, and there was little or no coordination between ministries at the working level since no good Persian would try to "interfere" with the running of his colleague's domain. Nasseri felt, however, that there was stronger and better coordination at the top levels of government than when he entered government service. While dishonesty and inefficiency still existed in the Iranian Government, Nasseri pointed out that they exist in any government and he felt there were fewer instances today than there had been in the past. Working level personnel are generally better educated now than in the past and most Iranian ministries are beginning "to operate like European ministries." In general, Nasseri felt that there was less wastage than in the past. Ward asked him to compare general operating efficiencies of the Persian bureaucracy with those of other nationalities. Nasseri admitted he was not familiar with working level operations in other ministries but felt that the Ministry of Labor operated as efficient as its British counterpart, but perhaps somewhat less efficient than its West German, French and U.S. counterparts.

Fereydun NASERI (Phonetic: nahsehREE) IRAN

Under Secretary for Planning and Research, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs

Addressed as: Mr. Naseri

Fereydun Naseri, about 39, became Under Secretary for Planning and Research in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs on 22 May 1974. He had previously served in the Ministry as director general of employment. As such, he was mainly concerned with manpower planning matters and was active in promoting the idea of the creation of a separate and independent employment service.

Naseri has a master's degree in law, political science and economics from Tehran University and a doctorate in the same subjects from Toulouse University in France, and he came to the United States for a specialized training program in sociopolitical problems. He has taught law at Tehran University and has worked as an attorney in the Ministry of Justice and as an expert in the Plan and Budget Organization. After serving as a consultant to the Embassy in Washington, he returned to Iran to become director of the Bureau of Socio-Economic Studies and Research and Manpower in the Ministry of Labor.

Naseri has traveled in Western Europe. He speaks fluent English and French.

26 February 1975

Fereydun NASERI